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I. INTRODUCTION
John Doe, a veteran of the U.S. military, receives medical benefits
through the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).  As a recipient of those
benefits, Doe is eligible to obtain free medical care at any VA facility 
until his death.  One day, Doe undergoes surgery at a VA hospital.  As he 
recovers from the operation, Doe suffers brain damage and eventually
falls into a coma.  As guardian ad litem, his wife, Jane, sues the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging medical 
negligence.  Jane seeks to recover, among other things, future medical 
expenses on her husband’s behalf.  The United States concedes liability,
but the parties dispute damages.  At trial, Jane testifies that she intends 
to keep her husband at VA facilities while he is comatose.  What result?1 
Under the prevailing view, Jane is entitled to recover a cash award for 
the present value of her husband’s future medical expenses.2  In the  
same vein, the United States, as defendant, is not able to reduce Jane’s 
damage award by the value of the VA medical care that her husband will 
receive in the future.  The validity of this result depends on probing two
legal rules: the provisions of the FTCA and the collateral source rule. 
As a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity, the 
FTCA provides an avenue through which an injured person can reach
into Congress’s pockets and recover for the government’s tortious
conduct.3  Though somewhat paradoxically, the FTCA holds the United
1. I owe this hypothetical’s factual pattern to Rufino v. United States, 642 F. 
Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 829 F.2d 354 
(2d Cir. 1987).  In Rufino, the court declined to allow the plaintiff to recover damages for 
future medical expenses.  Id. at 86.  The court found it significant that the veteran’s
family had decided to keep the veteran at VA facilities ever since the injury.  Id. at 85– 
86. The court also noted that any damage award for future medical expenses would 
benefit only the veteran’s family, not the veteran, who was comatose.  See id. The
plaintiff in Rufino did not appeal the lower court’s decision to deny her claim for future 
medical expenses. See 829 F.2d at 356.  After extensive research, Rufino appears to be
the only published decision not to award future medical expenses under the FTCA to a
veteran who was entitled to free VA medical care.
2. See infra Part II.E. 
3. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2671–2680 (2006).  Under the FTCA, the 
fora in which litigants must pursue their claims are the U.S. district courts.  Stephen L.
Nelson, The King’s Wrongs and the Federal District Courts: Understanding the 
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States liable to the “same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances.”4  In determining the extent to which the United States 
should be held liable under the FTCA, courts must apply the substantive 
law of the state where the tort occurred.5 
On the issue of damages, the FTCA expressly limits a claimant’s
reach to money judgments that compensate the claimant for his or her 
loss, including those awards that serve to compensate for future medical
expenses.6  As the introductory fact pattern indicates, calculating future
medical expenses for FTCA plaintiffs who are veterans of the U.S. military 
is complex, primarily because veterans—who likely will receive VA medical 
care in the future—seek to recover expenses they will never incur— 
expenses the tortfeasor, the U.S. government, will eventually foot the bill 
for.7  As a societal segment who likely will receive VA medical care in 
the future, veteran-plaintiffs, simply by virtue of their status as veterans, 
pose a unique problem to courts and test just how effectively the tort 
system computes damages.8  The undeniable reality in these cases is that 
veterans ask the United States to “pay . . . twice for the same injuries”:
259, 271 (2009).  But before litigants may file their FTCA claims in the district courts,
they must first present them to the “appropriate Federal agency,” which has six months
to deny or otherwise dispose of the claims.  Chelsea Sage Durkin, Comment, How 
Strong Stands the Federal Tort Claims Act Wall? The Effect of the Good Samaritan and
Negligence Per Se Doctrines on Governmental Tort Liability, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 269, 270 
(2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Further, the FTCA does not completely abrogate the United States’ sovereign
immunity.  Instead, the statute contains thirteen exceptions that operate to bar litigants’ 
claims against the United States, including claims arising in a foreign country and claims
arising out of government activity based on: the performance of a discretionary function,
mishandled letters by postal service employees, the United States’ monetary activities,
armed forces’ combat activities, the Panama Canal Company’s activities, the Tennessee 
Valley Authority’s activities, tax collection, several intentional torts, admiralty, wars,
quarantines, and banks.  Nelson, supra, at 271 & n.55. 
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2674. 
5. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9–12 (1962). 
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (exempting the United States from liability for prejudgment
interest or for punitive damages).
7. See, e.g., Amlotte v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 2d 922 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
8. Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 
HARV. L. REV. 741, 741 n.7 (1964) (providing, incidentally, the basis of the veteran-
plaintiffs’ argument that the deterrent rationale underlying the collateral source rule is 









   
 

















first through federal benefits and then through a damage award for future 
medical expenses.9 
The relationship between a veteran’s status as a recipient of federal
benefits and the veteran’s request for future medical expenses in tort 
implicates the collateral source rule.10  As a common law doctrine still 
intact today, the rule prohibits courts from reducing a plaintiff’s damage
award by “collateral” compensation—or to put it plainly, by compensation 
received from a source other than the tortfeasor.11  By even greater force
of logic, then, the collateral source rule allows courts to reduce a
plaintiff’s damage award if the tortfeasor has compensated or promised
to compensate the plaintiff for injuries suffered.12  Along these lines, the 
United States, in defending against veteran-plaintiffs’ FTCA claims, 
argues the collateral source rule should not apply because the VA
medical care to which veterans are entitled is not a collateral benefit.13 
In syllogistic terms, the United States’ argument is as follows: 
Major premise: Under the collateral source rule, a plaintiff cannot 
recover damages for compensation he or she has received or will receive 
from the tortfeasor.
Minor premise: The United States is obliged to provide eligible 
veterans with VA medical care for injuries suffered.
Conclusion: A veteran-plaintiff eligible for VA medical benefits who 
sues the United States for personal injuries cannot recover damages for 
future medical expenses because the veteran will receive compensation
—medical care—from the tortfeasor—the United States. 
Veteran-plaintiffs, of course, respond in kind, countering with arguments 
grounded in federal precedent.14  It is simply unfair, veterans argue with
the weight of several federal judges behind them, to substitute future VA 
medical care they are entitled to receive for a cash award they could use, 
9. Defendant’s Post-Trial Memorandum of  Points & Authorities Showing that 
the Court Should Deduct the Value of Past and Future Federal Benefits from Any
Potential Award of Damages at 1, Schoenfeld v. Quamme, No. 3:02CV00819 (S.D. Cal.
Sept. 14, 2009), 2009 WL 3500909 [hereinafter Defendant’s P&A]; see also Brooks v. 
United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53–54 (1949) (noting the United States is forced to pay twice 
for the same injuries in this scenario).
10. Note, supra note 8, at 741 n.7. 
11. Michael I. Krauss & Jeremy Kidd, Collateral Source and Tort’s Soul, 48 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 8 (2009) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A 
(1979)). 
12. Accord In re Air Crash Near Cerritos, 982 F.2d 1271, 1277 (9th Cir. 1992);
Thomas v. Shelton, 740 F.2d 478, 484–85 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Note, supra note 8, at 
741 (contending courts can mitigate damages without upsetting the tort system’s main 
objectives if tortfeasors themselves reduce the plaintiff’s loss).
13. See, e.g., Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d 924, 934 (3d Cir. 1964) (“The 
government argues . . . [it] will be forced to pay twice for this future [medical] care, 
which it is not required to do under [collateral source] principles.”).




























   
 
 
   
[VOL. 49:  501, 2012] Future Medical Expenses
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
if they so wished, to pay for medical care at a private hospital.15  This  
fairness consideration, along with the bulwark of precedent—the logical
underpinning of which is less than pellucid—ultimately is sufficient to 
carry the day; courts consistently hold in the veteran-plaintiffs’ favor and
allow them to recover future medical expenses without requiring an 
offset.16 
This Comment probes why courts reach that conclusion, especially in 
an era of increasing national debt and expanded government liability.17 
The simple answer, as the harrowing metaphors used to describe 
veteran-plaintiffs’ injuries remind us,18 may indeed be fairness or
justice.19  But without a defense of conventional wisdom, that answer is 
only as simple as the chancellor’s foot is lengthy.20  Maybe the answer
has its roots in logic, but forcing a tortfeasor to pay twice plainly spells
overcompensation.  Perhaps the text of the FTCA provides an answer, 
but even a cursory glance at the statute reveals that it does not.  The 
upshot is a jurisprudence that is wrong in policy, logic, and law. 
15. Or to pay down their mortgage. Or to pay for their ice cream addiction.  Or to 
donate to their favorite charity. The point here is that the alternative—entitlement to VA 
medical care—necessarily predetermines the use to which they put their damage award, 
which is inconsistent with the familiar tort principle that plaintiffs need not use their 
damage recoveries for any specific purpose.  See John A. Lovett, Doctrines of Waste in a 
Landscape of Waste, 72 MO. L. REV. 1209, 1236–40 (2007). 
16. See, e.g., Molzof v. United States, 6 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1993).  But cf. 
Rufino v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 84, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (allowing offset), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 829 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1987).  Interestingly, the 
court in Rufino did not even mention New York’s collateral source rule in its opinion.
Instead, the court used a balancing test in determining that the veteran’s lack of 
dissatisfaction with the VA system meant he would more likely than not use the free VA 
medical care in the future. Id.
17. See infra Part IV.B–C. 
18. Plaintiff’s Trial Brief at 10, Schoenfeld v. Quamme, No. 3:02CV00819 (S.D.
Cal. Nov. 23, 2008), 2008 WL 7022606 (quoting a medicine and rehabilitation expert 
who analogized the veteran-plaintiff’s leg injuries to “a wooden frame structure where 
the frame is suffering from dry rot and the attached lumber is coming loose and falling
off” and followed the analogy with his prognosis that “[a]ny attempt to reattach the 
lumber on the frame structure with either nails, glue, or other devices[] will be met with 
poor results because the frame is not adequate”). 
19. See G. Michael Harz, Comment, The Liability of the United States Government 
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 601, 617–18 (1988) (noting 
that the government exists to serve the people fairly and “justice” would be “denied” if 
the United States did not have to pay for a veteran’s future medical expenses). 
20. See JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43–44 (Frederick Pollock ed.,
Quaritch 1927) (1689) (reducing equity to a subjective measure that changes from person 




























In this Comment, I aim to expose the jurisprudential flaws in this area 
of the law and advocate as my prescription a refocused jurisprudence. 
Part II describes how courts have historically come to the conclusion 
that veterans suing under the FTCA should be awarded future medical 
expenses despite their entitlement to VA medical care.  In sorting through 
several pertinent cases, this Part summarizes the framework courts have
used when awarding future medical expenses to veterans under the FTCA. 
Part III addresses a threshold issue: the extent to which courts using 
this framework have overcompensated veterans.  Overcompensation occurs
only insofar as veterans in fact pocket the damage award and continue to
rely on the VA medical care to which they are entitled.  Yet factual data
on this point does not exist. That reality grounds my analysis, and in this
Part, I ask instead whether veterans who are awarded damages for future
medical expenses are likely to use that money to seek private medical
care.  The object of this “likely” standard is analysis that probes the extent
to which veterans are satisfied with the VA system.  This Part finds that
veterans are very satisfied with the VA system and thus concludes that 
veterans will ultimately pocket the cash award and rely on the VA
medical care to which they are entitled.  This scenario results in
overcompensation.
Having established that overcompensation is likely, I address in Part
IV why overcompensating veterans under the FTCA matters on a policy
level.  This Part identifies a trend under which expanded government 
liability and voluminous claims against the United States exacerbate the 
pattern of overcompensation discussed above.  It concludes that the issue 
needs to be addressed and that the outcome should be changed. 
Part V exposes the problems with the courts’ jurisprudence and provides 
a solution that breathes meaning into the FTCA’s text, a text that courts
largely have abandoned as a collection of catchword phrases.  In hewing
more closely to the FTCA’s text, this solution would supplant the courts’ 
former reasoning, such that veterans suing under the FTCA would be 
unable to recover future medical expenses to the extent that they are
entitled to receive free VA medical care.
II. TRACING THE COURTS’ MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 
A.  The Collateral Source Aspect
A logical starting point in tracing the courts’ modern jurisprudence is
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in which the tort took place governs in FTCA actions.21  Accordingly,
state collateral source rules apply under the FTCA.22  Although several 
states have statutorily abolished or modified the collateral source rule,23 
numerous others have retained the rule.  Each state has variations in its
collateral source rule, but the rule generally provides that “if an injured
party receives some compensation for his injuries from a source wholly
independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be deducted from 
the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the 
tortfeasor.”24  In other words, courts will not reduce a plaintiff’s damage 
award by any compensation the plaintiff has received from a source
wholly independent of the tortfeasor. 
Although the paradigm that the collateral source rule seeks to create is 
rather simple, a level of complexity arises when determining whether 
government benefits are collateral to a plaintiff’s damage award in an
FTCA action.25  This is because state collateral source rules “do[] not 
necessarily take into consideration cases in which the United States is a
defendant—as well as the payer of . . . benefits—nor would [they] since 
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over injury claims against the 
United States for money damages.”26 
Thus, to remedy the awkward application of state collateral source
rules to government benefits in FTCA actions, federal courts have 
fashioned a body of federal common law in an attempt to define whether 
and when government benefits are collateral in FTCA actions.27  In this 
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006), construed in Richards v. United States, 369 
U.S. 1, 9–12 (1962). 
22. See, e.g., Molzof v. United States, 6 F.3d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying
Wisconsin’s collateral source rule in an FTCA action).  Despite their evidentiary 
components, state collateral source rules are considered substantive laws.  19 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4512 (2d ed. 1996). 
23. For an exhaustive list of states that have modified their collateral source rules, 
see Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick W. Fitzgerald, The Collateral Source Rule and Its 
Abolition: An Economic Perspective, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 57 app. I at 71–79
(2005). 
24. Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 63 (Cal. 1970) (citing Peri
v. L.A. Junction Ry., 137 P.2d 441, 452 (Cal. 1943)).
25. See, e.g., Amlotte v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 2d 922 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
26. Id. at 927 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)). 
27. Note, supra note 8, at 741 n.7 (noting that the test sought to resolve “problems
of identity” that arose “[w]hen one branch of the government is the tortfeasor and 
another branch pays for the loss”).  Inherent in this analysis is the demonstrable fact that
courts did not create the federal test blindly.  Instead, the federal test is based on the 




























   
 
 
Comment I refer to that body of law as the “federal test.”  Under the 
federal test, courts have held that government benefits are collateral— 
and thus cannot be used to reduce a plaintiff’s damage award—if (1) the 
benefits “come[] from a specially funded source distinct from the
unsegregated general revenues” of the U.S. Treasury,28 or (2) the plaintiff
has contributed to the benefits.29 
To give an example of the federal test as applied, plaintiffs in FTCA
actions can recover damages for medical expenses without a judicially
mandated reduction of the award by the value of the Medicare benefits 
to which they are entitled.30  This is because the government distributes 
Medicare benefits out of a fund to which Medicare recipients contribute; 
this fund is supplied by social security taxes, which Medicare recipients
have paid.31  To give another example, under the FTCA courts will reduce a
veteran’s damage award for medical expenses by the value of TRICARE
benefits to which the veteran is entitled primarily because “[a]ll of the 
money for the [TRICARE] program comes from the general treasury of
the United States.”32 
Logically, then, under the federal test, baseline VA medical benefits 
are not collateral to an FTCA award.  This is true because (1) VA medical 
require the source of the collateral payments to be “wholly independent” from the 
tortfeasor.  See, e.g., Helfend, 465 P.2d at 63 (citing Peri, 137 P.2d at 452). United 
States v. Harue Hayashi suggested a federal equivalent—collateral payments are those 
payable from specially funded revenues, and noncollateral payments are those funded by
the U.S. Treasury.  282 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1960).  Additionally, many state 
collateral source rules require collateral benefits to be those to which the plaintiff has 
contributed.  See, e.g., Kickham v. Carter, 335 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Mo. 1960) (“Upon
principle there would appear to be no logical reason for defendant to receive the benefit 
of hospitalization payments (in the nature of insurance) made by an organization such as
Blue Cross to which plaintiff had no doubt made contributions in accordance with a 
membership agreement.”).  The Eight Circuit, in adopting that very same principle, has
supplied the federal equivalent. See Overton v. United States, 619 F.2d 1299, 1305–06
(8th Cir. 1980). 
28. Molzof v. United States, 6 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Harue 
Hayashi, 282 F.2d 599). 
29. Id. (citing Overton, 619 F.2d 1299).  Most courts have held that a veteran’s 
service in the U.S. military does not qualify as a “contribution” within the meaning of 
this test. See, e.g., Mays v. United States, 806 F.2d 976, 977 (10th Cir. 1986). 
30. Berg v. United States, 806 F.2d 978, 985 (10th Cir. 1986).  Although the court 
in Berg began its discussion by addressing Colorado’s collateral source rule, it did not 
rely on state law to decide the issue.  See id. at 984 (quoting Kistler v. Halsey, 481 P.2d 
722, 724 (Colo. 1971)).  Instead, the court relied on federal cases from other circuits that 
had applied the federal test. See id. at 985 (collecting cases). 
31. Id. 
32. Mays, 806 F.2d at 977.  As it did in Berg, the Tenth Circuit first addressed 
Colorado’s collateral source rule.  See id. (quoting Kistler, 481 P.2d at 724).  It then 
decided the issue by considering the “source of the funds” as it related to the federal test. 
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benefits are paid from the General Treasury of the United States,33 and 
(2) veterans do not contribute monetarily to their baseline VA medical 
benefits.34  But if VA medical benefits are not collateral, why do courts
allow veterans to recover future medical expenses under the FTCA?  After 
all, courts allowing recovery generally agree that VA medical benefits 
are not collateral within the meaning of the federal test.35  It is  against  
this backdrop that Part II.B traces the modern jurisprudence to which
courts adhere. 
B.  Brooks v. United States
As previously discussed, courts generally allow veterans to recover future 
medical expenses under the FTCA.36  To get to that outcome, however, 
courts have departed from the Supreme Court’s dicta in Brooks v. United
States.37  In Brooks, the Court held that statutory provisions for veterans’ 
disability payments did not forbid veterans from suing under the FTCA.38 
The Court then remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit to determine
whether veterans’ disability benefits should offset their damage awards.39 
In so remanding, the Court hinted that it saw “no indication that Congress 
meant the United States to pay twice for the same injury” when veterans
sued under the FTCA.40 On remand, the Fourth Circuit deducted the
veteran’s disability benefits from his damage award.41  The court’s reasoning 
mirrored the Supreme Court’s dicta: 
33. Note, supra note 8, at 741 n.7. 
34. Determine Cost of Care, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.va. 
gov/healthbenefits/cost/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
35. See, e.g., Walsh v. United States, No. 07-CV-568-PJC, 2009 WL 3755553, at 
*4 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2009) (allowing the plaintiff to recover future medical expenses
“[r]egardless of whether the medical benefits . . . constitute a collateral source”).  But cf.
Molzof v. United States, 6 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding, in the alternative, that 
VA medical benefits are collateral under the federal test because veterans contribute to
them).  The Molzof court concluded that veterans contribute to their VA medical benefits 
through the blood, sweat, and toil of their military service.  Id. at 467. 
36. See supra Part I. 
37. 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949).  Perhaps to justify their departure from the Supreme
Court’s reasoning, other courts have downplayed Brooks’s significance with sleights of 
hand, and most notably so in Feeley, in which the court thought it “clear that [the
language in Brooks] is not holding, or even dictum.” 337 F.2d 924, 933 (3d Cir. 1964). 
38. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 53. 
39. Id. at 54. 
40. Id. at 53–54. 





   





















It seems perfectly clear that in making the award of damages to plaintiff 
nothing should be included on account of hospital or medical expenses which 
the government has paid . . . .  It seems equally clear that the award should be 
diminished by the amount which he has received or is to receive from the 
government by way of disability benefits.42 
The Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit in Brooks clarified the
framework courts should use in approaching windfall scenarios arising 
in FTCA actions.  First, as the Fourth Circuit did on remand, courts must 
follow the FTCA’s textual requirements and look to the substantive law 
of the state where the tort occurred.43 In Brooks, for example, North 
Carolina law precluded a plaintiff from recovering damages from a 
tortfeasor if another defendant had already compensated the plaintiff for 
injuries suffered.44  Second, Brooks clarified that courts should resolve
issues arising under the FTCA in light of the policy that Congress, in
passing the FTCA, had no intention of forcing the United States to pay
twice for a single injury.45 
C.  Feeley v. United States
A few years after Brooks in Feeley v. United States, the United States,
as defendant, asked the Third Circuit to adopt the Brooks framework and 
deduct the value of a veteran’s entitlement to VA medical care from a 
damage award for medical expenses.46  The United States grounded its 
position on collateral source law and reasoned the benefits did not come 
from a source independent of the tortfeasor.47  In determining the merits,
the Feeley court first discussed Pennsylvania’s collateral source rule.48 
42. Id. (emphasis added).  For these propositions, the court cited Holland v. 
Southern Public Utilities Co., which held that under state law the amount another 
defendant pays the plaintiff should be credited against what the plaintiff otherwise would 
recover for his or her injury.  180 S.E. 592, 593–94 (N.C. 1935). 
43. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9–12 (1962). 
44. See Holland, 180 S.E. at 593–94. 
45. 337 U.S. at 53–54. 
46. 337 F.2d 924, 934 (3d Cir. 1964). 
47. See id. at 927–28. 
48. Id. at 928.  The court purported to research whether, in a lawsuit against a 
private defendant, Pennsylvania law would require the plaintiff’s damage award to be
offset by the VA medical care that the plaintiff had received.  Id. at 927. Curiously, the 
court also noted that it could not find any Pennsylvania cases in which the state was both
a defendant and payer of medical benefits.  Id. at 932.  Using the state as an analog 
misses the point because the FTCA holds the United States liable to the same extent as a
private individual—not a government entity—under like circumstances.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2674 (2006). Indeed, the Supreme Court has interpreted the words of the FTCA to 
“mean what they say, namely, that the United States waives sovereign immunity ‘under 
circumstances’ where local law would make a ‘private person’ liable in tort.”  United
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It then declared Pennsylvania’s collateral source rule to be “of little 
help” and looked to Brooks to guide its inquiry.49 
In considering Brooks, the court agreed to deduct past medical expenses 
from the award.50  But it refused to follow Brooks’s rationale on future
medical expenses, primarily because the court thought it “unconscionable” 
to force plaintiffs to choose between using public hospitals and bearing
the costs of the medical expenses themselves.51  The court’s language 
deserves quotation here at length:
[A]cceptance of the government’s position would result in forcing the plaintiff,
financially speaking, to seek only the available public assistance. Private medical
care would be obtained at the plaintiff’s own expense.  We think that this is an 
unconscionable burden to place on the plaintiff.  A victim of another’s tort
is entitled . . . to choose . . . his own doctor . . . .52 
D.  Molzof v. United States
The Seventh Circuit confronted this same issue in Molzof v. United 
States.53  The Seventh Circuit first explained the interplay between state 
collateral source rules and awarding future medical expenses.54  The court 
may have felt obligated to address Wisconsin’s collateral source rule 
because the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit
with specific instructions to “evaluate the recoverability of [damages
49. 337 F.2d at 932–33. 
50. Id. at 933–34. 
51. Id. at 935. 
52. Id. at 934–35.  Following Feeley’s lead, a district court in Connecticut awarded 
future medical expenses to a veteran who sued the United States for medical
maltreatment he received at a VA hospital. See Powers v. United States, 589 F. Supp. 
1084, 1108 (D. Conn. 1984).  At that time, the collateral source rule in Connecticut 
applied to “medical payments” and had “long been in effect in th[at] jurisdiction.” 
Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 271 A.2d 94, 96 (Conn. 1970).  Unlike the 
Feeley court, however, the Powers court did not analyze Connecticut’s collateral source 
rule.  In fact, the court did not even mention the collateral source rule, nor did it cite to
any Connecticut cases.  Instead, Powers simply explained that future VA medical 
benefits were “far too speculative” to determine with any certainty.  589 F. Supp. at 1108.  It 
also agreed with Feeley that veterans have a right to select a doctor of their choice.  Id.
(citing Feeley, 337 F.2d at 934–35).  Specifically, the court stated that deducting the 
plaintiff’s VA medical benefits from the damage award for future medical expenses 
would “unduly limit and virtually pre-determine . . . the source of such medical care.” 
Id.
53. 6 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1993). 
54. Id. at 464. 
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for future medical expenses] under Wisconsin law.”55  The Court  also  
hinted that a setoff might be necessary, opining that Wisconsin law might
“require[] a setoff when a [private] defendant already has . . . agreed
to pay[] expenses incurred by the plaintiff.”56 
Despite the hint, the Seventh Circuit held that Wisconsin would 
categorize a veteran’s VA medical benefits as collateral.57  In so concluding, 
the court grounded its analysis on a Wisconsin state case, Smith v.
United Services Automobile Ass’n.58  In that case, a serviceman received 
free medical care at a naval hospital after he and the defendant collided 
in a car accident.59  The serviceman sued to recover the value of those
services under his father’s insurance policy, which covered medical 
expenses.60 The insurance company denied liability, contending the
serviceman did not incur any expenses while hospitalized.61  Siding with
the serviceman, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the policy required
the insurer to pay up.62  In ruling, the court noted that state precedent 
differentiated between “gratuitously provided” services and services for
which a plaintiff had paid consideration.63  Because, the court reasoned, 
veterans were entitled to medical care as “compensation for services 
rendered,” not as a gift, the state precedent governing gratuitous services 
was inapplicable.64 
On this logic, the Seventh Circuit in Molzof concluded that VA medical
benefits were collateral because veterans did not receive those benefits
without first “contributing part of [their] salary to sustain the program.”65 
According to the court, veterans “contributed” to the VA benefits insofar 
as they received “lower salar[ies] in order to defray the costs” of their 
medical care.66  In other words, the court argued, veterans contribute to
the VA medical benefits to which they are entitled through the blood, 
sweat, and toil of their military service.67 
The court could have stopped at that point in the opinion because
Smith appeared to preclude the United States from reducing the plaintiff’s 
damage award by his VA medical benefits.  But on the opinion went, 
55. 502 U.S. 301, 312 (1992).  The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue
because the lower courts did not address it. Id.
56. Id. 
57. Molzof, 6 F.3d at 467. 
58. 190 N.W.2d 873 (Wis. 1971). 
59. Id. at 873. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 874. 
62. Id. at 875. 
63. Id. at 874–75. 
64. Id. at 875. 
65. 6 F.3d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1993). 
66. Id. 
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presumably because the court believed state law’s garb was insufficient
to adequately clothe its decision.  Indeed, the court went on to justify its 
holding in light of the Feeley framework.68  It first noted that other cases
consistently had held that past medical benefits were not collateral to an 
FTCA award.69  It then reasoned that those cases were inapposite because
“[t]he plaintiff here . . . does not seek compensation for past medical
treatment, only future medical treatment.”70  For that proposition, the 
court cited Feeley and held that the plaintiff could recover future medical
expenses from the United States despite his entitlement to VA medical
71 care. 
E.  Modern Jurisprudence 
Taken together, Feeley and Molzof clarify the framework courts use in
determining whether a veteran may recover future medical expenses in
an FTCA action—the modern jurisprudence to which courts adhere. 
First, most courts begin the inquiry by addressing the collateral source 
rule of the state where the tort occurred.72  The inquiry is almost 
superficial, however, because these courts consistently conclude that
state collateral source rules do not help answer whether VA medical
benefits are collateral to an FTCA damage award.73 Next, courts look
68. Id. at 467–68 (citing Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d 924, 935 (3d Cir. 
1964)). 
69. Id. at 467. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 468 (citing Feeley, 337 F.2d at 935).  FTCA claimants have looked to 
Molzof as the “most important case in understanding the effect of the collateral source 
rule and its application when a[n FTCA] plaintiff . . . is entitled to future medical care 
through the VA.”  Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s 
Post-Trial Memorandum of Points & Authorities Showing that the Court Should Deduct 
the Value of Past and Future Federal Benefits from Any Potential Award or Damages at
2, Schoenfeld v. Quamme, No. 3:02CV00819 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009), 2009 WL
3500910  [hereinafter Opposition].  Some have even referred to it as a “mandate” that
had to be followed.  See, e.g., id. at 4.  As the defendant in FTCA actions, however, the 
United States has taken a different view of Molzof, referring to it as a case that “turned 
on an estimate of a then-nonexistent state court interpretation of Wisconsin collateral 
source law.”  Defendant’s P&A, supra note 9, at 4; accord United States’ Response 
to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 14–15, Taylor v. United States, 
No. 2:09-CV-00065-J (D. Wyo. Feb. 12, 2010), 2009 WL 4459755 [hereinafter 
Response] (arguing Molzof’s application of Wisconsin’s collateral source law was 
“questionable” and “not well-reasoned”). 
72. See, e.g., Molzof, 6 F.3d at 467; Feeley, 337 F.2d at 927. 
73. See, e.g., Feeley, 337 F.2d at 932–33 (noting that “[m]ost cases involving the
United States as a defendant will be litigated in a federal forum and, certainly, all Federal 
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past state law to the federal test, a body of federal common law that has
attempted to define whether and when government benefits are collateral 
in FTCA actions.74 
Using the federal test, several courts have held that VA medical benefits
are not collateral to an FTCA damage award “because the benefits do
not come from a specially funded source and ostensibly because the
veteran did not contribute to [the] medical benefits.”75  Thus, as to a
veteran’s past medical expenses, courts inquire no further and allow an
offset.76 
Courts ruling on a veteran’s request for future medical expenses, 
however, generally allow recovery because “forc[ing] a plaintiff to choose 
between accepting public aid or bearing the expense of rehabilitation 
himself” presents the plaintiff with “an unreasonable choice.”77  In so  
reasoning, these courts add a consideration of purported fairness— 
although VA medical care is not collateral, courts do not allow an offset 
because a “victim of another’s tort is entitled . . . to choose . . . his own
doctor.”78 
III. THE EXTENT TO WHICH COURTS OVERCOMPENSATE 
VETERANS UNDER THE FTCA 
Courts using the framework discussed above to allow veterans to
recover future medical expenses when they are entitled to VA medical
care do not overcompensate them per se.  For instance, veterans who use 
their damage awards to seek private medical care outside the VA system
Tort Claims Act cases will be in the federal courts”); Walsh v. United States, No. 07-
CV-568-PJC, 2009 WL 3755553, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2009). 
74. See Walsh, 2009 WL 3755553, at *4. 
75. Molzof, 6 F.3d at 466. 
76. See, e.g., Feeley, 337 F.2d at 934; Green v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 633, 
644 (E.D. Wis. 1982), aff’d on other grounds, 709 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1983). 
77. Feeley, 337 F.2d at 934.  In the context of medical negligence cases arising
under the FTCA, courts are especially loath to allow an offset because doing so would 
“force the plaintiff to undergo treatment at a [VA] facility whose sister facility
. . . caused the plaintiff to suffer [injuries].”  Powers v. United States, 589 F. Supp. 1084, 
1108 (D. Conn. 1984). 
78. Feeley, 337 F.2d at 935.  Ironically, courts adding this fairness consideration 
emphasize the need for judicial restraint in the same breath.  See, e.g., Molzof, 6 F.3d at 
468 (opining that Congress, and not the court, should require FTCA damage awards for 
future medical expenses to be offset); Ulrich v. Veterans Admin. Hosp., 853 F.2d 1078, 
1084 (2d Cir. 1988) (“That this might result in a windfall for [the veteran] is a matter for
Congress, not the courts.”); Powers, 589 F. Supp. at 1108–09 (“The Court wishes to
emphasize, however, that proper Congressional action, such as tying in the set-off 
provision of 38 U.S.C. § 351 . . . to the medical treatment available to veterans under 
[the VA system] would eliminate not only the windfall conundrum which confronts and
concerns federal courts under these, or similar circumstances, but also protect the federal 
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are not overcompensated at all.  Overcompensation, in this sense, occurs
only insofar as veterans in fact rely on VA medical care after receiving
their damage awards.
Quantifying and qualifying the phenomenon of overcompensation
poses substantial problems, primarily because case-by-case research of it 
yields imperfect results.  Indeed, we cannot draw reliable conclusions from
the mere fact that, in one case, a veteran seeking future medical expenses
conceded he would continue to rely on the VA medical care to which he 
was entitled.79  Similarly, we cannot extrapolate anything meaningful
from the fact that, in another case, a veteran seeking future medical
expenses lived in Europe, experienced difficulties in traveling to VA 
facilities, and advised the court that he would seek private medical care 
in the future.80 
Instead, mining the collective conscience of veterans—and their
satisfaction with the VA system—appears to provide a more reliable
metric, even if it does not conclusively establish whether veterans will in 
fact rely on VA care.  At a minimum, it reliably indicates the extent to
which veterans recovering future medical expenses are likely to rely on 
their VA benefits, thereby pocketing the cash award and exacerbating
the windfall problem.  In that vein, this Part seeks to measure veteran
satisfaction with the VA system.
Research suggests that veterans entitled to VA health benefits 
“consistently outrank[] private health” care recipients as the most
content sector of the U.S. health care population.81  As polled, areas of 
satisfaction include quality of overall health care, service timeliness,
equipment and supply efficiency, treatment effectiveness, and safety in 
conducting procedures.82  According to the American Customer Satisfaction 
Index, eighty-five percent of inpatients at VA medical centers and
eighty-two percent of outpatients at VA clinics are satisfied with the care
given at those facilities.83 Although it may be surprising to some, this 
79. Rufino v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 84, 85–86 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 829 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1987). 
80. Opposition, supra note 71, at 7–8. 
81. Lynn Goya, Veterans To Be Offered a Personalized Veterans Health Benefits 
Handbook, VETERAN J. (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.veteranjournal.com/veterans-health-
benefits-handbook/. 
82. Id. 
83. ACSI Scores for U.S. Federal Government 2010, AM. CUSTOMER 











   
 
  




     
  
 
       
  
satisfaction is not surprising to health care experts, many of whom
“have . . . looked to the VA’s remarkable success for significant lessons
applicable to the broader U.S. health care system.”84 
Veteran satisfaction with the VA system can be attributed in part to 
the Veterans Equitable Resource Allocation (VERA) program, a capitated 
budgeting system in which VA facilities are given a set amount of
resources per enrolled veteran patient.85  As a capitated budgeting system, 
VERA does not give VA facilities incentives to maximize billable 
services.86  Thus, without any need to produce revenue, VA facilities do 
not have to forgo, and instead can focus on, the quality of care they are
providing.87 
The high percentage of veterans satisfied with VA care might also be 
attributable to the advanced health information technology that the VA 
uses.88  Most private health care providers in the United States keep only 
paper records, which often do not fully inform physicians of services 
that patients have received at other medical facilities.89  Inadequacies in 
paper records mean that physicians might duplicate laboratory tests, skip 
over significant events in a patient’s medical history, or prescribe an 
inappropriate drug or pharmaceutical.90 Under the VA system, however,
every patient has an electronic health record.91  That electronic record is
found in a department-wide database known as the Veterans Health
Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA).92  Full access to 
a veteran patient’s health record under VistA is vitally important to the
VA’s capacity to provide adequate care and is “often cited by VA officials
as a key to the department’s efforts to achieve high quality ratings.”93 
_content&view=article&id=238:asci--scores-for-us-federal-government-2010&catid=14: 
asci-results&Itemid=298. 
84. Michael J. Jackonis et al., War, Its Aftermath, and U.S. Health Policy: Toward
a Comprehensive Health Program for America’s Military Personnel, Veterans, and
Their Families, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 677, 678 (2008) (citing Gary J. Young et al., 
Quality Improvement in the US Veterans Health Administration, 9 INT’L J. FOR QUALITY 
HEALTH CARE 183, 183–88 (1997), available at http://intqhc.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/ 
reprint/9/3/183.pdf); accord Catherine Arnst, The Best Medical Care in the U.S., BUS. 
WK. (July 17, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_29/b3993061.
htm. 
85. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 3016, THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM FOR 









93. Id.  Indeed, electronic health records address several common problems in 
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Further, veteran satisfaction with the VA system can be attributed to 
increased government funding in the last decade.  The Bush administration 
coupled the VA’s medical care mission with military efforts in Afghanistan
and Iraq, and in fiscal year (FY) 2003, the administration dedicated $24 
billion of the total budget to hospital and medical care for veterans.94 
Anticipating thousands of veterans returning from service overseas, the 
Bush administration allotted $67 billion to the VA in FY 2005 and 
reserved $27 billion for hospital and medical care.95  The President’s FY 
2008 budget for the VA proposed $83 billion,96 citing the need to
“[p]rovide[] medical care to over 155,000 returning . . . servicemembers.”97 
In FY 2009, the Obama administration set aside $92 billion for the 
VA, with $41 billion dedicated to medical care.98  The administration set 
aside even more in FY 2011, increasing the VA’s budget authority to 
$124 billion, with $51 billion reserved for medical care.99  President
Obama pledges that within five years he will increase the VA’s overall
budget by roughly $25 billion.100 
management, and connectivity. Id.  “In theory, an [electronic health record] could give 
providers up-to-date information about a patient at the point of care, including his or her
history, allergies, and medications, along with the relevant diagnoses and laboratory
tests, enabling providers to . . . avoid duplicate tests and adverse drug interactions.” Id. 
at 16.
94. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 288 (2002), available at http://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2003-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2003-BUD-3-14.pdf. 
95. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 289–90 (2004), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2005-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2005-BUD-26.pdf. 
96. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 120 (2007), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/pdf/budget/veterans.pdf. 
97. Id. at 117. 
98. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 109, 111 (2008), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2009-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2009-BUD-24.pdf. 
99. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 119 (2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2011/assets/veterans.pdf. 
100. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fy2010_department_veterans (last visited Apr. 7,
2012).  President Obama also has assured veterans that his new health care plan will not 
change their access and entitlement to VA health care. See Tom Philpott, Obama:
Health Plan Won’t Hurt Vet Care, MILITARY.COM (Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.military. 
com/features/0,15240,197017,00.html. 
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Despite these budgetary developments, several studies have noted
three particular grievances that veterans have with the VA health care
system.  First, VA health care services are sometimes not available in
localities in which eligible veterans live.101  Second, eligible veterans do
not always enroll in the VA health care system, either because they are
indifferent or unaware.102  Third, Congress’s slow hand in approving budgets
sometimes means that the VA must skimp, operating for extended periods
of time without the supplies or funds necessary to run facilities or purchase 
medical equipment that may save veterans’ lives.103  The government is
currently attempting to address all three issues.  As to the first concern,
the Obama administration promises to open VA facilities in localities 
where veterans might live, with the hope that with easy access will come
more enrollment.104  As to the second concern, Obama promises to reach
out to veterans more aggressively in order to educate them on their
eligibility for VA medical benefits.105  As to the third concern, the VA 
asked Congress to advance a release of $50.6 billion of the FY 2011 $57 
billion total budgetary allowance for VA medical care so that funding 
delays would not obstruct veterans’ access to medical care.106 
Veteran satisfaction with and government attention to the VA system 
make it likely that veterans recovering future medical expenses under the 
FTCA will continue to rely on the VA medical care to which they
are entitled, thereby pocketing the cash award.  This results in 
overcompensation.
IV. WHY OVERCOMPENSATING VETERANS MATTERS 
At first blush, whether courts should overcompensate veterans for their
losses under the FTCA seems microcosmic. In fact, overcompensating 
plaintiffs in tort is somewhat commonplace.107  But I am not addressing
the drawbacks of overcompensation per se.  Instead, I am seeking to 
identify the dangers of overcompensating veterans in a world shot
through with alarming social developments.108  In this Part, I discuss 
 101. David Goldstein, For Veterans in Rural Areas, Health Care Can Be a Battle, 
MCCLATCHY (June 7, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/06/07/115409/for-
veterans-in-rural-areas-health.html.




 106. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 99, 
at 117. 
107. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 391 (Ct. App. 
1981) (awarding punitive damages). 
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those developments at length and articulate the dangers that attend 
overcompensation at this moment in history.
A.  Justice Traynor’s Tradeoff 
The tort system often expands or contracts, as the case may be, to 
effectuate policy preferences.109  Sometimes, it does both simultaneously. 
Workers’ compensation110 and the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund (Fund)111 are examples of this phenomenon, and both operate 
under the framework of a “tradeoff” system.112  This tradeoff is a simple
one: lawmakers who choose to expand an entity’s liability for tortious 
 109. Edmund Ursin, Judicial Creavitiy and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 229, 
230–32 (1981). 
110. Each state has its own statutory workers’ compensation framework.  For a
fairly representative framework, see CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3600–3605 (West 2011 & Supp.
2012). 
111. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 
§§ 401–409, 115 Stat. 230, 237–41 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101
note (2006)).
112. The workers’ compensation system allows employees to recover damages 
without having to prove negligence, but employees are entitled only to scheduled
damages for wage loss and cannot recover for their pain and suffering.  JoEllen Lind, 
The End of Trial on Damages? Intangible Losses and Comparability Review, 51 BUFF. 
L. REV. 251, 267 & n.67 (2003) (quoting RICHARD EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
TORTS 860 (7th ed. 2000)). 
The Fund has yielded a similar result.  Congress passed the Fund to “serve as a
national expression of unity in the face of a tragedy unique in American history, as well 
as to help survivors.”  Michael I. Meyerson, Op-Ed., Losses of Equal Value, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 24, 2002, § 4, at 10, available at 2002 WLNR 4432480.  The Fund entitled those
who had suffered physical injury and families of those who had died in the September 
11th attacks to compensation on a no-fault basis.  Robert M. Ackerman, The September
11th Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective Administrative Response to National 
Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 135, 144 (2005).  The Attorney General appointed a 
Special Master to administer the Fund and to distribute its moneys to each eligible 
claimant according to “the extent of the harm to the claimant, . . . the amount of
compensation to which the claimant is entitled based on the harm to the claimant, the
facts of the claim, and the individual circumstances of the claimant.”  Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(b)(1).  But the Fund had tradeoffs built into it.  
Professor Ackerman recapitulates these tradeoffs in his piece, explaining that negligence 
would not be considered an aggravating factor, the court would not award punitive
damages and would reduce the total recovery by collateral benefits received, and the
Special Master’s decisions would “not [be] subject to judicial review.”  Ackerman,
supra, at 144–45.  For an application of the Fund’s framework to victim compensation 
funds remedying other disasters, including Hurricane Katrina, see generally Nathan
Smith, Comment, Water, Water Everywhere, and Not a Bite To Eat: Sovereign 







   
    
 


























conduct should simultaneously limit the damage awards to which plaintiffs
are entitled.113 
Perhaps no one understood this tradeoff system better than Justice 
Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court.114  In Muskopf v. Corning 
Hospital District, Justice Traynor led the California Supreme Court to 
abolish the doctrine of state governmental immunity.115  In his opinion
for the court, Justice Traynor justified expanding the government’s liability
by reasoning that the government could spread the loss without much
difficulty: “If the reasons for [sovereign immunity] ever had any substance
they have none today.  Public convenience does not outweigh individual 
compensation, and a suit against [the government] is against an entity 
legally and financially capable of satisfying a judgment.”116  The result 
was an enormous expansion of California’s governmental liability.117 
But Justice Traynor did not expand liability unthinkingly.  He also 
fervently understood the need to curtail damage awards.118  For that  
reason, in Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines Justice Traynor complained
that pain and suffering damages in negligence cases were “increasingly
anomalous as emphasis shift[ed] in a mechanized society from ad hoc
punishment to orderly distribution of losses through insurance and the
price of goods or of transportation.”119  He realized these “losses [were]
borne by a public free of fault” and would be distributed among the public 
as “part of the price” of doing business.120  In other words, if Los Angeles
Transit Lines had to pay a substantial money judgment, it would be 
forced to defray those costs by charging more for its bus fares. Likewise,
113. Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Enterprise Liability Reexamined, 75 OR.
L. REV. 467, 473–77 (1996). 
114. Justice Traynor rarely missed an opportunity to expand an entity’s liability.
See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171–72 (Cal. 1964) (holding
retailer strictly liable); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900–01
(Cal. 1963) (holding manufacturer strictly liable); State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v. 
Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 285–86 (Cal. 1952) (holding that plaintiffs no longer needed to 
prove physical harm to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (“In my
opinion it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability
when an article that he has placed on the market . . . proves to have a defect that causes 
injury to human beings.”).
115. 359 P.2d 457, 458 (Cal. 1961). After much ado, in 1963 the legislature passed
the Tort Claims Act, which presently governs tort claims against the State of California 
and its agencies and employees.  CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 810–997 (West 2005 & Supp. 
2012). 
116. Muskopf, 359 P.2d at 459. 
117. See Laura Oren, Signing into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, Federal Rights, and 
State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 53 n.301 (1991) 
(referring to Justice Traynor’s Muskopf opinion as “pathbreaking”). 
118. Nolan & Ursin, supra note 113, at 474–75. 
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its liability insurer, who ultimately would end up paying the money
judgment, would pass along those costs by raising its insurance premiums. 
Justice Traynor teaches an important lesson in Muskopf and Seffert: if 
courts are willing to expand liability, they should be cognizant of the 
effect that high damage awards may have on the general public.121  But
this tradeoff system begs two questions. First, is liability really expanding?
Second, do social developments warrant limiting damage awards? 
B.  Expanding Liability 
Congress fundamentally expanded the United States’ tort liability
when it passed the FTCA in 1946.122  Before that time, a person could 
not sue the United States to collect monetary damages because “the king 
[could] do no wrong.”123  And although lawmakers preserved some
aspects of the United States’ sovereign immunity, modern jurists and 
academics alike have questioned and criticized those exceptions with 
great fervor.124 As a result, the United States’ limited sovereign immunity
is eroding.125  The path of the law indicates that this decay will continue.126 
121. Nolan & Ursin, supra note 113, at 473–77. 
122. James E. Pfander, Iqbal, Bivens, and the Role of Judge-Made Law in 
Constitutional Litigation, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1387, 1406 n.109 (2010).  For a
discussion of the extent to which plaintiffs were unable to assert otherwise meritorious 
claims against the United States before Congress passed the FTCA, see United States v.
Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 154 (1963). 
 123. Reginald Parker, The King Does No Wrong—Liability for Misadministration, 
5 VAND. L. REV. 167, 167 (1952); accord Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental
Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1926).  The concept of sovereign immunity has
its roots in the English feudal system: 
Sovereign immunity began with the personal prerogatives of the King of 
England.  In the feudal structure the lord of the manor was not subject to suit in 
his own courts.  The king, the highest feudal lord, enjoyed the same protection: 
no court was above him.  Before the sixteenth century this right of the king 
was purely personal.  Only out of sixteenth century metaphysical concepts of 
the nature of the state did the king’s personal prerogative become the sovereign 
immunity of the state.  There is some evidence that the original meaning of the
pre-sixteenth century maxim—that the king can do no wrong—was merely that 
the king was not privileged to do wrong. 
The immunity operated more as a lack of jurisdiction in the king’s courts 
than as a denial of total relief.  There was jurisdiction, however, in the Court of
Exchequer for equitable relief against the crown.
Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 458 n.1 (Cal. 1961) (citations omitted). 
124. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 127–34. 
125. For an example of this erosion, see Sauceda v. United States, No. CV-07-2267-
PHX-DCG, 2009 WL 3756703, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2009). 
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For instance, in Feres v. United States the Supreme Court carved an 
important exception into the FTCA by holding that active duty military
members could not sue the government for injuries they sustained
“incident to service.”127  And although the Feres decision has come to 
embody a doctrine that is still intact today, its support has dwindled to 
dangerous levels in both judicial and academic circles.  In fact, its critics 
fell one jurist short of obtaining a huge victory in United States v. 
Johnson, a case in which four Justices of the Supreme Court voiced their
willingness to overturn the Feres decision.128  An odd bedfellow to
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, Justice Scalia noted that Feres
had received “widespread, almost universal criticism” and rested on 
questionable judicial reasoning.129  Justice Scalia’s concerns have been 
reiterated in academia, where scholars continually berate the “reluctantly 
applied”130 Feres doctrine as “too broad,”131 “inequitable,”132 and a 
“labyrinth.”133 As a result, Congress appears likely to overrule Feres in 
the near future.134 
126. Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 
(1897) (describing how the law is predictable in its course).  In his seminal work, Justice 
Holmes explains that legal issues must be resolved in light of practical considerations. 
Indeed, Justice Holmes thinks it is “revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law 
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV,” and he goes on to note that “[i]t is 
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, 
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.” Id. at 469. 
127. 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
128. See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700–01 (1987) (Scalia, J., joined
by Brennan, Marshall, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (5–4 decision). 
129. See id. (quoting In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 
1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
130. Flora D. Darpino, Eroding the Feres Doctrine—A Critical Analysis of Three 
Decisions, ARMY LAW., Apr. 1996, at 26, 28. 
131. Deirdre G. Brou, Alternatives to the Judicially Promulgated Feres Doctrine, 
192 MIL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007). 
 132. Kenneth R. Wiltberger, The Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical
Accountability Act of 2009: An Opportunity To Overturn the Feres Doctrine as It Applies
to Military Medical Malpractice, 8 AVE MARIA L. REV. 473, 498 (2010). 
133. Helen D. O’Conor, Federal Tort Claims Act Is Available for OIF TBI 
Veterans, Despite Feres, 11 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 273, 313 (2008). 
 134. See, e.g., Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009, 
H.R. 1478, 111th Cong. (2009); see also H.R. 1478–Carmelo Rodriguez Military 
Medical Accountability Act of 2009, OPENCONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/ 
bill/111-h1478/show (last visited Apr. 7, 2012) (resolving to amend the FTCA to allow
claims to be brought against the United States for “damages relating to the personal 
injury or death of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States arising out of a 
negligent or wrongful act or omission in the performance of medical, dental, or related 
health care functions . . . that is provided by a person acting within the scope of the 
office or employment of that person by or at the direction of the government”).  The 
2009 bill was a successor to a similar bill that failed to pass in 2008.  See Carmelo
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The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Olson135 is another
example of the current trend, the focus of which is to expand the 
government’s liability.136 The litigants in Olson asked the Court to
determine whether courts should hold the United States liable to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances if the
government engages in conduct in which a private individual does not 
ordinarily engage.137  The Court agreed that courts should, holding that
federal mine inspectors are liable under the FTCA to the same extent as 
“private persons who conduct safety inspections.”138 
Olson has “ridiculous” implications because it exposes the United 
States to broad liability, thus making the case for limited damages more 
salient.139  Chelsea Durkin illustrated these implications quite persuasively 
in her discussion of Tekle v. United States, a case in which the Ninth
Circuit reversed a judgment entered after the district court granted
summary judgment to the United States in an FTCA action in which the 
plaintiff alleged federal agents falsely arrested him.140 Applying the
Olson framework, the court concluded the plaintiff raised genuine issues 
of material fact as to whether the agents failed to adhere to the standard
with which private individuals must comply when making citizens’ 
arrests.141  Thus, according to Tekle’s logic, “federal officer[s] must actually
observe a person committing . . . a misdemeanor in order to arrest the 
person, because ‘[r]easonable cause to believe that a misdemeanor has 
been committed is not sufficient.’”142  If they do not, any arrest they
make will open the United States up to potential liability under the
FTCA.143 
135. 546 U.S. 43 (2005). 
136. See Durkin, supra note 3, at 280. 
137. See 546 U.S. at 45.  More specifically, the Court had to determine whether 
federal mine inspectors should be held liable to the same extent as a private individual 
under like circumstances. Id.
138. Id. at 47. 
 139. Durkin, supra note 3, at 280–81 (discussing those implications at length). 
140. Id. at 280 (citing Tekle v. United States, 457 F.3d 1088, 1091–93 (9th Cir. 
2006), withdrawn and amended by 511 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2007)).
141. Tekle, 511 F.3d at 853–56. 
 142. Durkin, supra note 3, at 280 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting Tekle, 457 F.3d at 1101).  Holding federal officers—and by extension, the 
United States—to this heightened standard may prevent them from fulfilling their duty to
keep the peace. Id. at 280–81. 
143. Id. at 280.  In a concurring opinion in Tekle, Judge Fisher warned that Olson
improperly “undermine[d]” the “unique obligations of law enforcement officials.”  Tekle, 



































Perhaps Sauceda v. United States provides a more illuminating 
example of Olson’s pitfalls.144  In that case, the plaintiffs sued the United
States under the FTCA, alleging that a Border Patrol agent negligently 
deployed a controlled tire deflation device—a spike strip—ahead of their
approaching vehicle.145  The United States moved for summary judgment, 
but the court denied the motion because whether the agent was negligent 
was a factual determination for the jury: “[T]he alleged actions of [the
Border Patrol agent], if taken by a private person, could support a 
finding of negligence. . . .  [T]he throwing of an object at a fast-moving
vehicle ‘constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct a 
reasonable person would exercise.’”146 
Sauceda’s logic is inherently flawed.  Civilians do not pursue suspected 
criminals, nor do they throw spike strips when in pursuit.147  If they did,
they would likely be negligent.148  So if courts hold federal agents to that
standard, then logically the agents will be negligent.149  In turn, courts
will hold the United States liable under the FTCA.150  This expanded  
liability highlights the importance of limiting damage awards.
971, 978–79 (9th Cir. 1985)).  This was so, according to Judge Fisher, because “a private
citizen making a citizen’s arrest does not act under ‘like circumstances’ required by
§ 2674.” Id. at 857 (quoting Arnsberg, 757 F.2d at 979).  In so arguing, Judge Fisher 
forcefully criticized Olson’s failure to “provide courts with enough flexibility to preserve 
law enforcement privileges.” Id.
144. Sauceda v. United States, No. CV-07-2267-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 3756703 (D.
Ariz. Nov. 5, 2009). 
145. Id. at *3. 
146. Id. at *4 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Navajo Cnty. Juvenile Delinquency
Action No. 89-J-099, 793 P.2d 146, 147 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming lower court’s 
finding that juvenile was delinquent because he threw water balloons at moving
vehicles)). 
147. With this paradigm in mind, it is not surprising that the court could not find
any case in which a “private person deployed a [spike strip] in front of a passing
vehicle.”  Id.
148. See id. (“A private person’s deployment of a [spike strip] under these 
circumstances could be found to constitute an unreasonable use of force creating an
excessive risk of harm to Plaintiffs.” (citing Tekle, 511 F.3d at 854)); see also People v. 
Piorkowski, 115 Cal. Rptr. 830, 835 (Ct. App. 1974) (holding that a statute regulating 
citizens’ arrests did not permit bounty hunter to carry a weapon when arresting a
suspected robber).
149. See Sauceda, 2009 WL 3756703, at *4–5. 
150. But cf. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 75 (1955) (Reed, J., 
dissenting) (“[The FTCA] should be construed so as to accomplish its purpose, but not 
with extravagant generosity so as to make the Government liable in instances where no 
liability was intended by Congress.”). The exact result later reached in Sauceda was 
once decried by Justice Reed, who predicted that the expansive jurisprudential approaches
used in determining the scope of the United States’ liability under the FTCA would
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C.  Social Developments
As previously discussed, the FTCA provides plaintiffs with well-laid 
avenues that can be used to reach into the government’s pockets.151  But
that, without more, does not warrant implementing a tradeoff system.
Unfortunately, there is more; the government is also faced with a bevy
of tort claims that present the potential for double recovery.  Though the 
lingering effects of the Gulf and Vietnam Wars and the U.S. military’s 
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan surely have sustained the veteran population
—in the former case—and ushered in a new generation of veterans—in 
the latter case—relying on baseline VA medical care,152 less obvious— 
and yet, as I will argue, more potent—is the effect that mounting TRICARE 
costs have had and will have on this windfall problem.
TRICARE is a comprehensive health care insurance system available
to military personnel, retirees, and their dependents.153  An in-depth 
discussion of TRICARE is neither useful nor desired, but a typical 
policy allows its beneficiary to use private health providers, as long as 
those providers are included in the TRICARE framework and as long as 
the beneficiary pays a deductible and coinsurance.154 
151. See supra Part IV.B. 
152. Today, there are approximately twenty-two million living veterans of the
United States military.  VA Benefits & Health Care Utilization, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS
AFFAIRS, http://www.va.gov/VETDATA/docs/Quickfacts/Winter_12_sharepoint_final.pdf 
(last updated Feb. 3, 2012) (“Projected U.S. Veterans Population”).  More than eight million 
are enrolled in the VA health care system.  Id.  Since 2001, the VA has provided
medical care to more than 425,000 military personnel returning from Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Paul Sullivan & Lauren Hohle, More
Than 425,000 Iraq and Afghanistan War Veterans Treated by VA—More Than 250
New Patients Every Day, VETERANS TODAY (Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.veterans
today.com/2009/09/16/more-than-425-000-iraq-and-afghanistan-war-veterans-treated-
by-va-more-than-250-new-patients-every-day/.  Some have estimated that the VA will
treat up to one million veterans before both operations end.  Id.  In addition, veterans 
from the Vietnam and Gulf Wars are still in need of VA health care. There are currently
almost eight million Vietnam-era veterans.  Demographics, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFFAIRS, 
http://www.va.gov/VETDATA/Demographics/Demographics.asp (last updated Sept. 30, 
2006) (open “Period of Service” 2L Excel Spreadsheet).  The Gulf War involved another 
695,000 military personnel, many of whom have had to seek medical care for ailments
connected with service, especially Gulf War Syndrome.  See Kevin J. Dalton, Comment, 
Gulf War Syndrome: Will the Injuries of Veterans and Their Families Be Redressed?, 25
U. BALT. L. REV. 179, 180–81 (1996). 
153. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, What is TRICARE?, TRICARE, http://www.tricare.
mil/mybenefit/home/overview/WhatIsTRICARE? (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 










   
  
 
    
 
 
   
 
 



















TRICARE is extremely popular among our veterans.155  And with the
current influx of veterans, it is also extremely expensive to implement.156 
Part of the problem is that TRICARE “enrollment fees and cost
shares . . . have not increased in a decade.”157  Benefits offered in the
private sector, however, have been met with increased enrollment fees
and cost shares.158  As a result, beneficiaries increasingly have abandoned 
their private coverage in favor of TRICARE.159  Reacting to this
development, Department of Defense Secretary Robert Gates has noted 
the Department will include in its 2012 budget request “recommendations 
to raise TRICARE premiums for some beneficiaries.”160 
These higher premiums will force veterans to seek other options.  In 
that vein, many veterans may choose to rely on the VA’s baseline medical
benefits—free medical care.  This makes the windfall scenario more
likely because the government will defend more FTCA claims brought
by veterans who are entitled to medical care that will not be deducted from
their damage awards for future medical expenses.161  When taken together
with the United States’ expanding liability, this development would 
exacerbate the windfall problem—more veterans, more FTCA suits, more 
requests for future medical expenses, and more drain on a treasury that is
already spinning out of control. 
In all, these social developments justify implementing Justice
Traynor’s tradeoff system.  Jurists and scholars alike have viewed the
government’s sovereign immunity with distaste, and that view largely
has won out; the government’s liability is expanding.162  The government 
also must answer an influx of claims as the veteran population grows
and seeks to rely on the VA medical care to which it is entitled.
Mathematically, then, we can determine the total costs payable from the
Treasury by multiplying the United States’ probable liability by the 
155. See Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, Gates Seeking To Contain Military
Health Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/11/29/us/29tricare.html.






 160. Tom Philpott, Gates Aims To Raise TRICARE Premiums, DAILY PRESS (Aug. 
16, 2010), http://articles.dailypress.com/2010-08-16/news/dp-nws-milupdate-0816-
20100815_1_health-costs-health-care-tricare. 
161. FTCA suits brought by veterans covered under TRICARE do not present a
similar windfall problem because courts have generally held that a veteran’s damage 
award for future medical expenses must be offset by TRICARE coverage.  See, e.g., 
Mays v. United States, 806 F.2d 976 (10th Cir. 1986). 
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probable claims against which it must defend.  And just as Los Angeles 
Transit would charge higher bus fares if it had to compensate claimants
for pain and suffering, so too would the government pass along the costs 
of tort judgments against it to the public.163  Accordingly, Justice Traynor’s
tradeoff should apply: courts should be cognizant of the effect that high
damage awards have in an era of expanding liability.164  If courts are 
willing to expand liability, they should match that willingness with an 
accompanying aim to limit damage awards. 
V. A MORE SENSIBLE JURISPRUDENCE
This area of the law is muddled with bleak analysis and an unfocused 
jurisprudence.  By overcompensating veterans under the FTCA, courts 
have closed their eyes to the statute’s express language.  First, courts
have not held the United States liable to the same extent as a private 
individual under like circumstances.165  Second, courts have not applied 
the substantive law of the state in which the tort took place.166 
Instead, courts must start their analyses by selecting an appropriate 
analog.  If courts select an inappropriate analog, they will survey the 
wrong state case law.  After courts select the proper analog, they should 
apply the substantive law of the state where the tort took place, an FTCA
requirement that courts often neglect.167 
163. See 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006) (authorizing Congress to appropriate moneys due 
under final judgments against the United States in FTCA actions).  Some scholars have 
questioned why the United States, and not the government agency responsible for 
causing the injury, should be held liable under the FTCA.  See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, 
SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 106 (1983).  Professor
Schuck contends that holding the United States liable does little to deter negligent
agencies and officials. Id.  His argument rests upon the notion that agencies that do not 
foot the bill lack incentives to implement deterrent measures. Id.  For a rebuttal to
Professor Schuck’s argument, see William P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations 
Concerning Tort Liability of Government and Its Employees for Torts and Constitutional
Torts, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1105, 1165–68 (1996). 
164. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955) (“[W]hen
dealing with a statute subjecting the Government to liability for potentially great sums of 
money, this Court must not promote profligacy by careless construction.”). 
165. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006). 
166. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006), construed in Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 
1, 9–12 (1962). 
167. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 633, 644 (E.D. Wis. 1982)
(“[T]he question on which Wisconsin law does not control is whether a benefit received
from the government is, in fact, collateral to an FTCA judgment.  To answer that 





























   
   
 
 
A.  Framing the Issue: Selecting a Workable Analog
Courts awarding veterans damages for future medical expenses fail to
hold the United States liable to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances.168  Instead, courts erroneously hold the United
States liable to the same extent as a private individual under exact
circumstances.169  In this sense, courts have misapplied the FTCA’s
language to the collateral source rule. 
The court in Feeley seems to have started this trend.  In that case, the 
court thought the appropriate question for resolution was whether, in a 
lawsuit against a private defendant, state law required the plaintiff’s
damage award to be reduced by the VA medical care that the plaintiff
had received.170  Later courts followed Feeley’s lead, framing the
dispositive issue in a manner inconsistent with the FTCA’s language.
For instance, one court reasoned that “a private defendant cannot escape 
an award of damages in a civil suit for future medical expenses by
contending that a plaintiff, who happens to be a veteran, is entitled to
free medical care at a VA Medical Center.”171 
These courts erred.  They correctly changed the United States to a 
private individual but kept the circumstances—free VA medical care— 
constant.  The question is not whether state law would reduce damages 
that a private defendant must pay by the amount of the plaintiff’s VA 
medical care.  Framing the issue that way is not faithful to the FTCA’s 
text, which holds the United States liable to the same extent as private
individuals under like circumstances.172  In addition, by keeping the
circumstances constant, courts have virtually predetermined the answer
in any state that has retained the collateral source rule.  In other words, 
in a state with a collateral source rule, the answer is a simple one: a
private defendant cannot reduce the plaintiff’s damage award by
government benefits to which the plaintiff is entitled.173 
168. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674. 
169. See infra Part V.A.
170. Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1964). 
 171. Harz, supra note 19, at 616 (citing Memorandum Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law & Order at 14, Heitzenrater & Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-
C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988)).
172. Cf. id.  According to that article, allowing the government to furnish the 
claimant with free medical services in lieu of paying a monetary award does not hold the 
United States liable to the same extent as a private individual. See id. at 601–02.  This is
so, according to the article, because private individuals are not entitled to use the tort 
system as a “barter exchange.” Id. at 616. 
173. See, e.g., Feeley, 337 F.2d at 927 (disallowing offset for future medical 
expenses on the theory that a private defendant could not reduce a plaintiff’s damage 
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Admittedly, selecting an appropriate analog in this situation poses 
some analytical difficulties.  The first difficulty is that comparing the 
United States with a private individual is imperfect.174 The United States
is a multifaceted entity, replete with numerous departments and agencies; a
private individual, on the other hand, is a single organism.175  And at a 
certain level, this distinction might matter insofar as the collateral source 
rule is concerned.  For example, some believe the collateral source rule 
serves as a deterrent: it gives potential tortfeasors the incentive to take
precautions in conducting their affairs because courts will not reduce 
damage awards by benefits to which plaintiffs may be fortuitously
entitled.176  Giving that warning to an individual tortfeasor may compel 
174. LaBarge v. Cnty. of Mariposa, 798 F.2d 364, 367 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that 
the federal government cannot be “exactly like a private actor”).
175. See SCHUCK, supra note 163, at 101–02, 106. Courts have long struggled to 
reconcile these differences under the FTCA.  See, e.g., Rayonier Inc. v. United States,
352 U.S. 315, 319–20 (1957) (refusing to hold the United States liable to the same extent
as a municipal corporation or other public body, despite similarities between the 
entities); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64–65 (1955) (discarding the 
government’s contention that the United States is not liable for activities that private 
individuals do not perform); Paul F. Figley, Understanding the Federal Tort Claims Act: 
A Different Metaphor, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1105, 1114 (2009); see also
Durkin, supra note 3, at 273–79 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s consistently wrong 
approaches in determining the extent of the United States’ liability under the FTCA over
the decades).  These and other difficulties once prompted Judge Max Rosenn of the 
Third Circuit to refer to the FTCA as a “traversable bridge across the moat of sovereign
immunity.”  Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 717 (3d Cir. 1979).  For discussions 
that expand upon that metaphor, see generally Richard W. Bourne, A Day Late, a Dollar 
Short: Opening a Governmental Snare Which Tricks Poor Victims out of Medical 
Malpractice Claims, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 87 (2000), which argues that the FTCA is filled
with loopholes such that claimants in medical negligence cases are unable to recover 
when Congress categorizes medical workers as federal employees, and Dianne Rosky,
Respondeat Inferior: Determining the United States’ Liability for the Intentional Torts of
Federal Law Enforcement Officials, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 895 (2003), which contends 
that the doctrine of respondeat superior is ill-suited for application under the FTCA.
Some scholars, however, do not share Judge Rosenn’s views and instead believe the 
FTCA is an example of a federal statute that works. See, e.g., Jeffrey Axelrad, Litigation 
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 8 LITIGATION 22, 55 (1981) (“The [FTCA] as a
whole is an example—perhaps a rare one—of a statute that generally achieves its
intended purpose.”). 
176. John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1478, 1546–49 (1966).  Others take it further, boldly arguing the 
collateral source rule is punitive in nature.  See, e.g., City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue 
Constr. Co., 424 P.2d 921, 926 (Cal. 1967).  This view, I submit in accord with Professor 
Perillo, is “simply wrong.”  Joseph M. Perillo, The Collateral Source Rule in Contract 














     
  
   
  
   
















it to be careful.177  When the tortfeasor is the United States, however, the
same warning may have little deterrent effect.178  This is because the United
States qua tortfeasor—the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—is
often different from the United States qua payer of damage awards—the
Treasury Department or, more precisely, the taxpayer.179  In this sense,
admonishing the DHS to “take precautions” might be superfluous because 
some other government branch will be footing the bill for its negligence.180 
This particular imperfection need not be resolved, at least not here,
because it matters only insofar as the collateral source rule in fact serves
as a deterrent, which is debatable for several reasons.  First, advising
potential tortfeasors of the collateral source rule’s strictures may nonetheless 
fail to encourage them to take precautions not to be negligent.181  Second, 
177. Daena A. Goldsmith, Comment, A Survey of the Collateral Source Rule: The
Effects of Tort Reform and Impact on Multistate Litigation, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 799, 801
(1988). 
 178. SCHUCK, supra note 163, at 106 (“The United States Treasury, the liability
point in the current system, is too remote from officials’ operating conditions in the field; 
it neither understands particular programmatic functions and techniques nor possesses 
the administrative resources necessary to implement such knowledge at street level.”). 
In other words, the entity providing veterans with medical care—the VA—is quite apart 
from the entity that caused them to suffer injuries—the Department of Homeland 
Security.  Nominally, both fall under the visage of the all-encompassing U.S. government, but
in very real respects, they are different.
Somewhat playfully, we can expand this conundrum.  Within a given veteran-
plaintiff’s FTCA claim, we can identify up to five relevant entities.  Suppose again that 
the DHS injured the plaintiff and that, as a veteran, the plaintiff will receive medical care 
from the VA.  At this point, we have identified the tortfeasor and the supposed collateral 
compensator. Who else remains?  The Department of Justice, the entity sitting at the
defense table. The U.S. Treasury, the entity that will directly pay the damage award.
And the taxpayer, who will indirectly pay the damage award.  At least from a deterrence 
perspective, these distinctions surely matter, but I leave an in-depth analysis for another
day.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 102–03.  In so arguing, Professor Schuck overlooks several valid points
that are recapitulated in Kratzke, supra note 163, at 1165–68.  First, the FTCA waives 
the United States’, not the at-fault agency’s, sovereign immunity, id. at 1166, which
implies that Congress did not intend the FTCA to serve as a deterrent, id. at 1167 (“In
the event that Congress wants tort suits to deter agency misconduct, it can make its will 
understood.”).  Additionally, shifting the costs of tort judgments to the negligent agency
does not take into account the reality that government agencies often reorganize.  Id. (“In 
the event of reorganization, both the responsibilities and the risks of liability for injury-
causing misconduct are shifted from one agency to another.”).  Finally, the doctrine of 
respondeat superior—upon which the FTCA is based—rests upon the notion that the 
“entity that reaps the benefits should be the one that bears liability for injuries caused by
employee misconduct.”  Id. at 1166.  For purposes of this discussion, that entity is the 
United States, not the negligent agency.
181. Whether society can deter negligent conduct is a question to which no 
satisfactory answer has been given.  Compare Fleming, supra note 176, at 1548 (noting 
that deterrence as a justification for tort liability should be “confined to situations where
it can realistically perform an admonitory function, namely, only against defendants 
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even if the collateral source rule sufficiently deters tortfeasors, it makes
larger damage awards more likely and thus fails to deter potential victims; 
“[i]f tort awards are ‘too high,’ potential victims may have reduced 
incentives to take efficient precautions against injury.”182 
The second analytical difficulty is to determine the extent to which 
courts should generalize the analog. The analog cannot be “free VA 
medical care,” as Feeley and other courts have posited, because the
FTCA holds the United States liable to the same extent as a private
individual under like, not exact, circumstances.183  Perhaps it would be
correct to ask whether state law would reduce a plaintiff’s damage award 
by moneys the defendant has agreed to pay the plaintiff in order to 
“rectify the imbalance he [has] caused.”184  But that analog is also incorrect
because the United States’ obligation to pay preexists its negligence in 
the situation at bar. 
Instead, the issue, properly framed, is whether state law would reduce 
a plaintiff’s damage award for future medical expenses if, independent 
of tort, the defendant has already agreed to pay those expenses. As
framed, the issue accounts for the United States’ preexisting obligation
to pay for a veteran’s medical expenses.  It purposefully avoids asking 
whether the defendant has gratuitously promised to pay for the plaintiff’s
medical expenses because so framing the issue does not account for the 
United States’ irrevocable obligation to pay a veteran’s medical expenses. 
Further, the issue, as I have framed it, finds judicial support of the 
highest order; in Molzof, the Supreme Court expressly agreed with this
construction.185  In remanding the case to the Seventh Circuit, the Court
noted that Wisconsin law might have “require[d] a setoff when a [private]
defendant already has . . . agreed to pay[] expenses incurred by the
605, 615 (Ariz. 1984) (reasoning that “deterrence of negligent conduct” is a tort
objective), and  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(c) (1979) (providing that one 
goal of the tort system is to deter wrongful conduct).  In other contexts, courts have 
warmed to the view that negligent conduct cannot be deterred. See, e.g., Herring v. 
United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144–45 (2009) (reasoning that the exclusionary rule, the
purpose of which is to deter police misconduct, had no place in a situation in which law 
enforcement unlawfully seized evidence because the misconduct—negligently failing to 
delete defendant’s arrest warrant from law enforcement database—could not have been
adequately deterred). 
182. Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 21. 
183. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006). 
184. Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 48–50. 



























   
  
 
     
 
 
plaintiff.”186  The Court did not ask the Seventh Circuit to decide whether
Wisconsin law would require a setoff if a plaintiff in an action against a 
private defendant has received VA medical care.187  Doing so would not
have been faithful to the FTCA’s command, which holds the United
States liable to the same extent as private individuals under like, not
exact, circumstances.188 
Additionally, generalizing the analog from “free VA medical care” to 
“preexisting obligation to pay”—as I do in framing the issue—stays true
to the framework enunciated in Indian Towing Co. v. United States.189 
In Indian Towing, plaintiffs sued the Coast Guard for a host of maladies,
including failing to check and repair a lighthouse’s battery.190  The Supreme
Court held that the proper analog was a private person who “undertakes
to warn the public of danger and thereby induces reliance.”191 
Indian Towing’s teaching is simple: the FTCA must be read logically. 
The Court in Indian Towing could have held the United States liable to
the same extent as a private defendant who owned a lighthouse and 
failed to check its battery and sun relay system.  It did not, however, 
because private individuals do not normally own or operate lighthouses,
and even fewer private individuals own lighthouses and fail to maintain 
them properly.192 
186. Id. (emphasis added). 
187. Unfortunately, on remand, the Seventh Circuit glossed over the Supreme 
Court’s instructions.  The court failed to apply the correct analog and thus looked to state 
law that had no bearing on the issue before the court. See Response, supra note 71, at
14–15 (arguing Molzof’s application of Wisconsin’s collateral source law was 
“questionable” and “not well-reasoned”).  The Molzof court asked the wrong question; it 
asked whether a plaintiff could recover from a private defendant for medical expenses 
incurred, even though the plaintiff was entitled to free treatment at a naval hospital.
6 F.3d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1993).  In failing to ask whether Wisconsin would “require[] a 
setoff when a [private] defendant already has paid (or agreed to pay) expenses incurred 
by the plaintiff,” the court failed to hold the United States liable to the same extent as a 
private individual under like circumstances. 502 U.S. at 312.  To the extent that it 
improperly framed the issue, Molzof’s disposition is incorrect.  For a more detailed
analysis of the state law to which Molzof erroneously adhered, see infra Part V.B.2. 
188. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674. 
189. 350 U.S. 61, 62–65 (1955). 
190. Id. at 62 (repeating in the Court’s opinion plaintiff’s allegations that the Coast 
Guard failed to “check the battery and sun relay system”; “check[] the lighthouse . . . to 
make a proper examination of the connections which were ‘out in the weather’”; “repair 
the light”; or warn the public of the various malfunctions). 
191. Id. at 64–65. 
192. Recognizing this paradigm, the government in Indian Towing contended it was
not liable because private individuals do not operate lighthouses and thus no analog 
existed. Id. at 64.  In so arguing, the government asked the Court to adopt a framework 
in which the government, its agencies, and employees would not be liable for negligent 
performance of “uniquely governmental functions.” Id.  The Court disagreed. Id. at 69. 
Alternatively, in Indian Towing, the United States argued it should be liable to the same 
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As in Indian Towing, applying a narrow analog to the scenario I have 
developed in this Comment is illogical.  Courts should not ask whether 
state law would reduce a plaintiff’s damage award by the VA medical
care to which he or she is entitled because so framing the issue does not
account for the most critical aspect of the collateral source rule: the 
benefit provider, who can be either the defendant or an independent 
source.  Reading out the source of the benefit produces only one answer: 
a state applying a traditional collateral source rule would not reduce a
plaintiff’s damage award in a suit against a private defendant by VA
medical care the plaintiff had received or was to receive.193 The collateral 
source rule clearly forecloses such an offset.194 
On the other hand, asking whether state law would reduce a plaintiff’s 
damage award for future medical expenses by medical expenses the
defendant has an obligation to pay to the plaintiff does not presuppose 
one answer.  Instead, it requires courts to survey state law and make a
meaningful determination.  Additionally, only after generalizing the 
analog will courts survey the appropriate state law, namely, the extent to
which state law allows a plaintiff to recover future medical expenses 
when a private defendant has already agreed to pay those expenses.
B.  Resolving the Issue: Applying State Law 
After framing the issue properly, the next step is to resolve it.
Consistent with the FTCA, I suggest courts should apply the substantive 
persuasive, contending that under state law a municipal corporation was not liable for
injuries sustained as a result of negligent failure to maintain traffic lights.  Id. at 75–76
(Reed, J., dissenting).  The dissent then analogized street traffic lights to “navigation
lights,” which were at issue in the case at bar.  Id. at 76.  Concluding that municipalities
would not be held liable for failing to maintain navigation lights under state law, the 
dissent would not have held the United States liable for its failure to properly maintain
the lighthouse.  Id.  Consistently, however, the Supreme Court has refused to adopt the 
position that the dissent advocated in Indian Towing.  See, e.g., United States v. Olson, 
546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005).  Instead, under the prevailing view, the words of the FTCA 
“mean what they say, namely, that the United States waives sovereign immunity ‘under 
circumstances’ where local law would make a ‘private person’ liable in tort.”  Id.
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006)). 
193. See, e.g., Molzof v. United States, 6 F.3d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1993) (considering
that issue, as framed, and holding VA medical benefits are collateral under Wisconsin 
law).
194. This is so because the collateral source rule operates as a mechanism by which
the tort system ensures the tortfeasor bears the entire loss without benefitting from the



















      
 
     
 
   
 
   
    
 
 
   
   




    
   
law of the state where the tort occurred.195  A review of each state’s
applicable law is too ambitious a task for this Comment, but some examples
are apropos.  To that end, this Part reexamines Feeley and Molzof from 
the correct perspective.
1. Feeley Reconsidered 
In Feeley, an on-duty U.S. Post Office employee negligently injured a 
veteran in Pennsylvania.196 In determining whether the veteran could
recover future medical expenses despite his entitlement to VA medical
care, the court began its analysis by framing the issue incorrectly, asking
whether “Pennsylvania state law requires that in a suit against a private
defendant the hospital and medical care conferred by the [VA] be deducted 
from the [damage] award.”197  The court then cited to Pennsylvania’s
collateral source rule, which states that the “victim of a tort is entitled to 
receive from his tortfeasor the full amount he is entitled to . . . regardless 
of what the former receives from other sources.”198  Reciprocally, under 
Pennsylvania law, if a tort victim receives compensation from the
tortfeasor, then the victim is not entitled to receive from the tortfeasor
the full amount to which the victim would otherwise be entitled.199 
195. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9–14 (1962). 
196. 337 F.2d 924, 926 (3d Cir. 1964). 
197. Id. at 927. 
198. Id. at 928 (quoting Boudwin v. Yellow Cab Co., 188 A.2d 259, 259 (Pa. 
1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
199. In an effort to reform the state’s tort system, the Pennsylvania legislature has 
passed two statutes modifying the collateral source rule in professional liability actions. 
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8553 (West 2007); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.508 
(West 2007 & Supp. 2011).  Under the first statute, courts must reduce a plaintiff’s 
damage award by benefits a claimant is entitled to receive under an insurance policy.  42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8553. This modification does not affect the outcome of Feeley
because the VA is not a health insurer nor is free VA medical care an insurance benefit. 
The second statute reforming the collateral source rule in Pennsylvania applies only in 
the context of medical negligence actions.  40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.508.  
Section 1303.508 provides “a claimant in a medical professional liability action is 
precluded from recovering damages for past medical expenses . . . to the extent that the
loss is covered by a private or public benefit or gratuity that the claimant has received 
prior to trial.” Id. This provision does not apply to life insurance policies, pension plans,
social security benefits, medical benefits that must be repaid to the Department of Public 
Welfare, and public benefits “paid or payable under a program which under Federal 
statute provides for right of reimbursement which supersedes State law for the amount of
benefits paid from a verdict or settlement.” Id.
Neither statute affects Feeley’s reconsidered outcome because Feeley was not a 
professional liability action. See Feeley, 337 F.2d at 926 (noting U.S. Post Office 
employee negligently injured plaintiff).  If Feeley had involved professional negligence 
or, more specifically, medical negligence, then one could argue section 1303.508 should
apply, especially because it prevents plaintiffs from recovering only past medical
expenses, thereby implicitly allowing plaintiffs to recover future medical expenses. See





















   
   
   
 
   
 




[VOL. 49:  501, 2012] Future Medical Expenses
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
In applying the collateral source rule, the court stated the general rule 
that plaintiffs may recover doubly if they receive payment that is a “true 
gift.”200  It then held the plaintiff was not allowed a double recovery
because government benefits were not true gifts “bestowed on the 
veteran.”201  Oddly enough, the court then declared Pennsylvania law to 
be unhelpful in determining whether the VA medical benefits were
collateral.202  As previously discussed, the court ultimately allowed the
plaintiff to recover future medical expenses after applying the federal
test.203 
The Feeley court confused its analysis by asking whether VA medical 
benefits are collateral.204  That is simply not the issue before the courts.205 
section 1303.508 in medical negligence actions arising under the FTCA for several 
reasons.  First, section 1303.508 refers only to “collateral sources” and does not appear 
to dictate the result if the tortfeasor is the same source who has paid—or agreed to pay— 
moneys to the plaintiff. See id.  Additionally, section 1303.508 should not apply in 
FTCA actions to the extent that its provisions allow plaintiffs to recover damages despite 
their entitlement to social security benefits, welfare benefits, and a narrow category of
federal benefits for which the government has a right to reimbursement.  See id. This is 
so because in enacting these provisions, the legislature probably did not contemplate 
situations in which the United States is the tortfeasor and payer of these benefits. Accord
Amlotte v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 2d 922, 927 (E.D. Mich. 2003).  Thus, applying 
section 1303.508 in FTCA actions ignores the likely legislative intent. 
200. 337 F.2d at 930.  According to the court, allowing a plaintiff to recover doubly
if the plaintiff has received payment as a gift is justified because the donor’s intent 
necessarily implies that the donor did not give the gift with any intention to compensate 
the plaintiff. Id. at 928.  The tortfeasor cannot use gratuities to reduce payments the 
tortfeasor must make to the plaintiff because “[g]ratuitous payments cannot be linked to 
the imbalance between the tortfeasor and victim.”  Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 31. 
201. 337 F.2d at 932. 
202. Id.
203. Id. at 935. 
204. Id. at 932.  So framing the issue is particularly problematic because numerous 
states have modified the collateral source rule by statutorily defining which benefits are 
collateral.  See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1606 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, 
§ 2906 (2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6303(4) (West 2000); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
§ 4545 (CONSOL. 2007 & Supp. 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.580 (2011).  Many states— 
Michigan, to take one example—have statutorily defined government benefits as 
collateral to prevent courts and juries from considering them when awarding damages to 
a plaintiff. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6303(4).  The problem is that when the 
Michigan legislature passed this statute, “it [did] not necessarily take into consideration 
cases in which the United States is a defendant—as well as the payer of those benefits—
nor would it since federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over injury claims against
the United States for money damages.”  Amlotte, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 927.  Recognizing 
loopholes like these, several courts have held that the United States may assert state 
statutory caps on damages even though it does not strictly fit within the statutory
framework.  See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 821 F.2d 1428, 1431–32 (9th Cir. 1987)
535
  









   
  
    
 









Not to belabor the point, but the issue, properly framed, is whether state 
law would reduce a plaintiff’s damage award for future medical expenses
by expenses the defendant has an obligation to pay to the plaintiff.206 
And under Pennsylvania law, victims are not entitled to receive from 
tortfeasors the full amount to which they are entitled if those victims 
receive compensation from the tortfeasors.207  Thus, a defendant who has
an obligation to pay the plaintiff’s medical expenses is entitled to an 
offset under Pennsylvania’s collateral source rule, which disallows 
double recovery if the plaintiff receives moneys from the tortfeasor. 
2. Molzof Reconsidered 
In Molzof, a veteran sued the United States after receiving medical
maltreatment at a VA hospital in Wisconsin.208  In framing the issue, the
Seventh Circuit asked whether Wisconsin law allowed a plaintiff to 
recover future medical expenses in an FTCA action “even though the 
plaintiff is entitled to free medical care from the government as a 
veteran.”209  The court held the plaintiff could recover those expenses, 
reasoning that VA medical benefits were collateral under Wisconsin 
state precedent.210  For that proposition, the court relied primarily on 
Smith v. United Service Automobile Ass’n, which held that a plaintiff could 
recover medical expenses from his insurance company even though he 
obtained free medical treatment for his injuries at a naval hospital.211 
As in Feeley, the Molzof court framed the issue incorrectly and
improperly applied state law.  The court’s consideration of Smith
demonstrates this error.212 Smith relied solely on Kopp v. Home Mutual 
Insurance Co., which involved the interpretation of a plaintiff’s 
automobile liability insurance policy.213  Under the terms of the insurance
policy in Kopp, the insurer agreed to “pay all reasonable [medical] 
expenses incurred . . . [t]o or for the named insured.”214  The insurer in 
Kopp contended the policy was not operative because the plaintiff never 
(applying California’s $250,000 statutory cap in medical negligence cases to the United
States).
205. See supra Part V.A. 
206. See supra Part V.A. 
207. See Feeley, 337 F.2d at 928 (quoting Boudwin v. Yellow Cab Co., 188 A.2d 
259, 259 (Pa. 1963)). 
208. 6 F.3d 461, 462–63 (7th Cir. 1993). 
209. Id. at 464. 
210. Id. at 466. 
211. See id. at 466–67 (citing Smith v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n, 190 N.W.2d 873
(Wis. 1971)). 
212. See id. (citing Smith, 190 N.W.2d at 873). 
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“incurred” any expenses while hospitalized, as required by the provision.215 
The court disagreed and enforced the provision.216  According to the court, 
and as a general principle, the provision did not operate to allow a plaintiff 
to recover damages for medical services that a third-party volunteer
gratuitously bestowed onto the plaintiff.217  The provision did apply in
the case before the court, however, because the plaintiff indirectly
“incurred” expenses for his hospitalization by paying premiums to his
Blue Cross health benefit plan.218 
Smith involved the interpretation of an insurance policy identical to
the one in Kopp.219 According to the court in Smith, whether the policy 
allowed the plaintiff to recover hinged on whether the medical care to
which the plaintiff was entitled was gratuitous or something for which
he had paid a consideration: 
If the United States Navy, in providing free hospital and medical services to
its personnel, is a “third-party volunteer” providing a gift or gratuity, Kopp
controls to bar recovery by the plaintiff here.  If the Navy-provided hospital 
and medical services are provided for a “consideration,” and are not
gratuitously provided, Kopp controls to authorize recovery by the plaintiff 
here.220 
Smith concluded the provision was operative, reasoning the plaintiff paid 
a consideration for his medical benefits.221 
Relying on Smith, Molzof concluded that veterans paid a “consideration”
for their VA medical benefits.222  The court then pointed to Smith for the
proposition that a plaintiff is entitled to recover medical expenses if the 
plaintiff has paid a consideration for them.223  By grounding its analysis
on Smith’s fact-sensitive point, however, the Seventh Circuit misread
215. Id. The plaintiff did not incur any expenses in connection with his 
hospitalization because he subscribed to a Blue Cross hospital benefit plan.  Id. Under 
that plan, the plaintiff paid quarterly premiums to Blue Cross. Id.
216. Id. at 226. 
217. Id.
218. Id. at 225. 
219. Smith v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n, 190 N.W.2d 873, 874 (Wis. 1971).  Under 
the insurance policy, the insurer promised “[t]o pay all reasonable expenses incurred
within one year from the date of accident for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray and 
dental services, including prosthetic devices, and necessary ambulance, hospital,
professional nursing and funeral services . . . [t]o or for the named insured.”  Id. at 874 
n.1. 
220. Id. at 874. 
221. Id. at 875. 

































Smith and Kopp as announcing general propositions about the recoverability
of damages in Wisconsin.  Neither case provides any meaningful 
generalities, nor does either purport to decide whether and when benefits
are collateral; instead, Smith and Kopp are informative on the subject
only insofar as an insurance policy uses the word incur ambiguously.224 
If Molzof had framed the issue properly, it probably would not have
considered Smith and Kopp at all. 
The proper issue before the court in Molzof was whether Wisconsin 
state law would require a plaintiff’s damage award for future medical
expenses to be reduced by the value of medical expenses that the
defendant has a preexisting obligation to pay to the plaintiff.  As Molzof
noted, Wisconsin’s collateral source rule provides that “a personal injury
claimant’s recovery is not to be reduced by the amount of compensation
received from . . . sources ‘collateral’ to the defendant.”225  In other
words, under Wisconsin law a plaintiff’s recovery will be reduced by the
amount of compensation the plaintiff has received from sources not 
independent from the defendant.  Thus, in a case in which a defendant 
has a preexisting obligation to pay the plaintiff’s medical expenses,
Wisconsin’s collateral source rule would allow an offset.  This means
the Molzof court should have reduced the plaintiff’s damage award for 
future medical expenses by the value of the VA medical care to which
he was entitled. 
224. Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 201 N.W.2d 745, 752 (Wis. 
1972). 
225. Molzof, 6 F.3d at 464 (quoting Lambert v. Wrensch, 399 N.W.2d 369, 372 n.5
(Wis. 1987)).  In an effort to reform its collateral source rule in the context of medical 
negligence actions, in 2005 the Wisconsin legislature passed section 893.55, which 
provides that “[e]vidence of any compensation for bodily injury received from sources 
other than the defendant to compensate the claimant for the injury is admissible in an
action to recover damages for medical malpractice.”  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West
2006). 
In Molzof, the plaintiff sustained injuries after receiving medical treatment at a VA 
hospital.  6 F.3d at 462.  Thus, insofar as section 893.55 applies to medical negligence 
actions, it would be of some utility if Molzof were decided today.  How much utility it
would be, however, is less clear.  Section 893.55 is purely evidentiary because it merely
allows, without more, litigants to introduce evidence of a certain kind.  And as an 
evidentiary statute, section 893.55 likely is not the vehicle a court would use to
determine whether a damage award should be reduced by benefits to which the plaintiff 
is entitled because, after all, such a reduction or nonreduction is necessarily substantive
in nature.  Instead, to determine whether a damage award were subject to a setoff, a
Wisconsin court deciding Molzof today would simply apply Wisconsin case law in
accordance with the well-settled principle that state substantive law applies in FTCA 
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3. Justifying the Results 
Using this framework to reevaluate Feeley and Molzof is faithful to the 
FTCA’s command.  But that is not the only benefit.  This framework 
also comports with a fundamental objective of the tort system: to make a 
person whole.226 
Of course, according to tort reformists, the collateral source rule 
necessarily contravenes tort law’s objective to make a person whole
because it often allows a plaintiff to recover a damage award that
exceeds his or her injury-related costs.227  Indeed, the principle that
underlies the collateral source rule is that the victim should receive the 
windfall, and not the tortfeasor, if either party has an opportunity to
obtain one—if a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor pays for 
part of the victim’s loss.228  But what result if neither party has an
opportunity to receive a windfall?  This situation arises if the source who 
has paid—or agreed to pay—the victim’s loss is, coincidentally or not, 
also the defendant.229  If society allows the victim to recover that which 
he or she has already received—or will receive, in the case of an 
enforceable promise—then that victim necessarily recovers doubly.230 
In the same vein, society also forces the defendant to pay twice.231 
Some scholars have justified allowing the victim to recover in the 
latter situation by conceptualizing the make-whole principle narrowly.232 
226. See McInroy v. Dyer, 47 Pa. 118, 121 (1864).  See generally George P. 
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972); Stephen R.
Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992).
227. Jamie L. Wershbale, Tort Reform in America: Abrogating the Collateral 
Source Rule Across the States, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 346, 349 (2008).  Tort reformists
conceptualize the collateral source rule as a mechanism by which society can place the
burden of the loss on the tortfeasor, not the helpless victim.  See Note, supra note 8, at 
741. 
228. Adams v. Turner, 238 F. Supp. 643, 644–45 (D.D.C. 1965). 
229. Id.  Society encourages this situation because it means the tortfeasor has
“attempt[ed] informally to make amends for [his or her] actions.” Molzof, 6 F.3d at 465. 
230. Some disagree that the victim recovers doubly in this scenario.  See, e.g., 
Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 26–28.  That view implies a victim recovers only
insofar as the tortfeasor honors the victim’s request to be compensated.  Karsten v. 
Kaiser Found. Health Plan of the Mid-Atl. States, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1253, 1258 (E.D. 
Va. 1992), aff’d, 36 F.3d 8 (4th Cir. 1994). 
231. See Adams, 238 F. Supp. at 644–45. 
232. See, e.g., Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 26–28 (approaching the problem 
through the prism of “corrective justice”).  For a discussion of the objectives of tort 
compensation, see Symposium, Baselines and Counterfactuals in the Theory of
Compensatory Damages: What Do Compensatory Damages Compensate?, 40 SAN 






























To them, forcing the defendant to pay twice is acceptable if the defendant’s
duty as tortfeasor does not overlap with the preexisting duty to pay part 
or all of the victim’s loss.233  For example, Professor Michael Krauss
developed a factual scenario in which
Larry negligently prevents Jane from catching her plane to Atlanta, causing 
Jane to miss a meeting and lose $1000.  Fortunately, Jane had purchased an 
insurance policy against precisely this sort of occurrence and receives a
payment from that insurance carrier in the amount of $1000.  The insurance 
carrier is a sole proprietorship owned by Larry.234 
Professor Krauss concludes that Jane may recover $1000 from Larry 
because Larry’s furnishing Jane with that same amount under the
insurance policy is “not a purposeful act in rectification of the imbalance
he had created.”235 
As Professor Krauss noted,236 this view found support in Karsten v. 
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.237  In Karsten, the plaintiff brought
a diversity lawsuit in federal court against Kaiser for medical negligence, 
alleging one of its employees negligently delivered her premature 
stillborn fetus.238  She sought damages for the costs of a surgical procedure
that became necessary after the physicians allegedly botched the delivery of
her child.239  As the plaintiff’s health insurer, Kaiser fulfilled its insurance
obligation by conducting the procedure free of charge.240  Thus, Kaiser
argued, the plaintiff could not recover the market value of the second 
procedure because (1) she did not incur any expenses, and (2) Kaiser had
already paid these sums.241  The court disagreed and allowed the plaintiff 
to recover these damages, reasoning: 
233. Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 48. 
234. Id.
235. Id. at 49.  Krauss concedes that Larry compensated the victim in “precisely the 
amount of the harm caused by his negligent act,” but he nonetheless argues “the benefit 
was not meant to rectify the imbalance he caused.”  Id. at 48.  With this statement I am 
reminded of Emily Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 
1405 (2003), which argues that “remedies that pass as civil and compensatory are not 
solely concerned with losses, but also provide an outlet for vengeance.”  Though Krauss 
stops short of arguing the plaintiff’s damage award is a function of outright vengeance, 
he does seem to imply that a healthy measure of retribution factors into our make-whole
principle.  See Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 50. 
236. Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 49 (citing Karsten v. Kaiser Found. Health
Plan of the Mid-Atl. States, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1253, 1258 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff’d, 36 F.3d 
8 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
237. 808 F. Supp. 1253. 
238. Id. at 1254.  Because the court’s jurisdiction was based on diversity of
citizenship, it had to apply the substantive law of Virginia. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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The first payment of medical bills by the defendant was in its capacity as 
plaintiff’s insurer . . . .  The defendant is now being asked to pay these same 
medical expenses as compensatory damages.  Even though the same defendant 
is being asked to pay the same damages twice, it is patent that the nature of the 
two payments is different.  The nature of the first is as a payment from 
defendant as insurer to the plaintiff as the insured.  The nature of the second is 
as a payment from defendant as tortfeasor to the plaintiff as the party injured by
the defendant’s negligence.  It is axiomatic that the plaintiff is entitled to receive
the benefit of her bargain under the insurance contract, irrespective of the fact 
that the carrier servicing that contract may also be the tortfeasor.242 
In narrowly construing the make-whole principle, Professor Krauss’s
and Karsten’s views have implications that society is not likely willing
to accept.243  For instance, under this theory of corrective justice,244 
numerous benefits the government has conferred on the plaintiff, including
all federal, insurance, and employee benefits, are collateral.245  In addition, it 
yields to the victim an unnecessary windfall.  This windfall is unnecessary 
because the plaintiff can be compensated for his or her loss without
either party receiving a windfall.246  Perhaps most problematic is that
corrective justice relies too heavily on the tortfeasor’s mindset in making 
the victim whole.247  For one, plaintiffs probably do not care whether
242. Id. at 1257–58 (footnote omitted). 
243. As numerous state legislatures have demonstrated, one objective of tort reform 
is to modify the collateral source rule so as to limit, not expand, its application. See
Marshall & Fitzgerald, supra note 23, at 71–78 app. I.
244. Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 49.  Krauss believes the make-whole 
principle is an incoherent concept.  Id. at 28.  He prefers a tort system that focuses on the 
tortfeasor’s duty to “right the wrongs caused to the victim” instead of one that asks 
whether the tortfeasor has made the victim whole.  Id. at 22 (emphasis omitted).
245. Although these benefits are often collateral, Krauss and Karsten have created a 
non sequitur in which the benefits are necessarily collateral because, under their view,
the payer of the benefits did not give them to the victim so as to “rectify the imbalance 
he caused.” Id. at 48–50. 
246. Adams v. Turner, 238 F. Supp. 643, 644–45 (D.D.C. 1965) (“[The underlying 
principle of the collateral source rule] does not apply in a situation where the collateral
source is the defendant himself.  Under those circumstances no one gets a windfall and if
a recovery were allowed under those circumstances the result would be that the plaintiff
would receive a double recovery and that the defendant would be mulcted twice for the 
same item of damages.”). 
247. For classic discussions of the theory of corrective justice, under which a 
tortfeasor’s liability is premised on its duty to repay the victim for the injustice it has 
caused, see generally Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 
IOWA L. REV. 427 (1992); Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 15 (1995); and Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403
(1992).  I note parenthetically, however, that this philosophy “originated under primitive
law as a means of punishing wrongdoers and assuaging the feelings of those who had 
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tortfeasors intend to make them whole; they primarily care that the
tortfeasors pay up, one way or another.248  Society presumably feels the
same way, especially because it must absorb the costs of judgments that
tortfeasors ultimately pass along to it.249  Requiring tortfeasors to pay 
once, then, is in society’s interests.
The better result is one that accommodates a main objective of the tort 
system—to compensate the injured party—as well as the philosophy that 
underlies the collateral source rule—to burden the tortfeasor with the 
entire loss.250  The view I take is that courts should reduce damages if
the tortfeasor itself mitigates the victim’s loss because that scenario does 
not conflict with either goal.251 
As proof that no conflict exists, reconsider Professor Krauss’s
hypothetical in which Larry negligently causes Jane to incur $1000 in 
losses but also reimburses her for the loss as part of his obligation as her
insurer.252  Under my view, reducing Jane’s damage award is acceptable
because the objectives of the tort system and the collateral source rule
are both satisfied.  The tort system’s objective in compensating Jane for
her loss is satisfied because Larry’s payments to Jane cover her losses.
The collateral source rule’s objective in forcing the tortfeasor to bear the
entire loss is also satisfied because Larry, and not some other source,
puts Jane in the same position she was in before missing the plane.
been wronged.”  Seffert v. L.A. Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 345 (Cal. 1961) (Traynor, 
J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
248. See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort 
Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 275–76 (2001).  After all, the plaintiff’s 
primary motivation in filing a lawsuit is to collect damages, not to impress upon the 
defendant the plaintiff’s moral belief that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful. Id. at
284–85.  The economically motivated plaintiff does not care about the tortfeasor’s “duty
to repair,” which carries with it the notion that the tortfeasor must feel the wretch of its
wrongdoing.  Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67
IND. L.J. 349, 365 (1992).  But cf. Tom Baker, Teaching Real Torts: Using Barry
Werth’s Damages in the Law School Classroom, 2 NEV. L.J. 386, 390–91 (2002) (noting 
the “individual justice perspective” of tort law views the system as a mechanism by 
which society can right “individual wrongs” and “restore the moral balance between” the 
duties a plaintiff and defendant owe each other). 
249. Seffert, 364 P.2d at 345 (Traynor, J., dissenting) (“[Excessive damages] 
become increasingly anomalous as emphasis shifts in a mechanized society from ad hoc
punishment to orderly distribution of losses through insurance and the price of goods or
of transportation.  Ultimately such losses are borne by a public free of fault as part of the 
price for the benefits of mechanization.”).
 250. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 219–20 (5th ed. 1998) 
(defending the collateral source rule as a mechanism by which society forces tortfeasors
to internalize the full costs of their conduct); see also Molzof v. United States, 6 F.3d
461, 465 (7th Cir. 1993) (arguing that the collateral source rule does not allow a 
tortfeasor to “reap the benefits of the plaintiff’s foresight in obtaining coverage for future 
harm or his good fortune in obtaining compensation gratuitously”). 
251. See Note, supra note 8, at 741. 
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Under the result that Professor Krauss reaches, however, neither objective is
satisfied.  The result he advocates leaves Jane better off than she was
before missing the plane, thus overly satisfying the main objective of the
tort system.253 Krauss also ignores the role of the collateral source rule
because under his view Larry bears more than the entire loss. 
4. One Last Retort 
I have not yet addressed one lingering issue, one outside the FTCA’s 
black letters, one that veteran-plaintiffs likely would use as a retort to the 
framework I have proposed and defended in this Comment, one that 
proceeds as follows: extending the collateral source rule’s negative shell
to include compensation veterans will receive at some distant point in 
the future is wholly inappropriate and not tailored to our tort system’s 
basic theory of compensation.  Reduced to simple terms, the retort is that
substituting future compensation for present compensation is plainly
unfair.  In my rejoinder, I focus not on the narrow future-present distinction 
as it pertains to collateral source law but rather on its two broader
conceptual equivalents: first, that plaintiffs are not required to use their 
damage awards for any specific purpose or at any specific time and, 
second, that plaintiffs are entitled to receive their damage awards not 
periodically over time but rather in a lump sum at the time of judgment.254 
Tinkering with these familiar tort principles, and even abrogating
them, is not uncommon.  Tort reformists, for example, have subjected
them to a healthy measure of criticism, arguing these standards regularly
allow plaintiffs to recover windfalls by compensating them up front for 
future losses that, “should [they] die prematurely or should [their]
condition[s] unexpectedly improve,” may never come to pass.255 
Legislatures, too, have eschewed them altogether.  Take, for instance,
section 667.7 of California’s Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act 
of 1975 (MICRA), which provides that “future damages” awarded in a
253. Kenneth W. Simons, Compensation: Justice or Revenge?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1415, 1416 (2003) (“Overcompensation occurs when . . . benefits conferred by the
injurer are not deducted [from the damage award].” (emphasis added)). 
254. See supra pp. 504–05 and note 15.  I note parenthetically that a sustained 
defense of my views on this tort paradigm would require separate, stand-alone treatment; 
in this Comment, I opt instead for a superficial glaze, one I believe is sufficient for the 
reader to understand the issue. 
255. See Developments in the Law—Lawyers’ Responsibilities and Lawyers’
Responses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1573 (1994). 
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medical malpractice action are to be paid, at either party’s request, not in 
a lump sum but rather periodically as the plaintiff incurs the losses.256 
MICRA as a whole, it should be recalled, was passed after Governor 
Jerry Brown complained of “serious problems that had arisen . . . as a
result of a rapid increase in medical malpractice insurance premiums,”257 
and section 667.7 is plainly a fruit of that concern.  Comparable concerns, 
though admittedly on a much smaller scale, attend veteran-plaintiffs’ 
recoveries under the FTCA, yet no comparable fruit exists.  In this vein, 
extending the collateral source rule’s negative shell to include compensation 
the United States will pay to veterans is conceptually valid and perhaps 
even appropriate. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Veterans should not be able to recover future medical expenses in
FTCA actions to the extent that they are entitled to free VA medical
care.  By holding otherwise, courts commit errors of policy, law, and 
logic.  On a policy level, the courts drain the U.S. Treasury.  Congress 
must then defray the costs of the damage award by passing them along 
to the public.  This loss-spreading phenomenon is significant because its 
potential to adversely affect the public increases as the United States’
liability expands.  Additionally, at a purely legal level, two provisions of
the FTCA do not prescribe the result reached by the courts.  First, the 
FTCA requires courts to hold the United States liable to the same extent 
as a private individual under like, not exact, circumstances.  Second, it
calls for application of state substantive law, not federal common law.
As for logic, the courts allow veterans to receive a windfall.  Under the
circumstances, savvy plaintiffs will pocket the cash award and avail
themselves of the VA care to which they are entitled.  This paradigm of 
overcompensation violates the make-whole principle of the tort system. 
It similarly untethers the collateral source rule from one of its logical 
underpinnings, namely, that the tortfeasor should not bear less—or
more—than the entire loss. 
 256. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 667.7 (West 2012) (applying only to awards totaling 
at least $50,000 in future damages). 
257. Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Cmty. Hosp., 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 673 (1984) (en 
banc). 
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